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The fair division of scarce resources among agents is a challenging issue across
a range of applications, especially when there is competition among agents. One
application of resource division is in Air Traffic Management (ATM). During severe
weather, when there is a reduction in en-route capacity, a specialist using the TSD
(Traffic Situation Display) identifies a problem area by creating a Flow Constrained
Area (FCA). The air traffic flow management specialists at the Air Traffic Control
System Command Center can enter the capacity of the FCA, expressed as the num-
ber of flights that can be managed per hour, and an Airspace Flow Program (AFP)
will be run. Thus, affected flights will be delayed or rerouted.
Fair allocation of available resources among airlines is very challenging when
there is a reduction in en-route resources. Each airline will typically place a different
relative weight on delays, rerouting and cancelation. Whereas some airlines would
like to preserve the on-time performance for certain flights and cancel or reroute
many other flights, other airlines prefer to have less rerouting and cancelations while
tolerating higher total delay. Therefore, fairness concerns as well as the ability to
respond to different user priorities have played an important role throughout the
development of allocation procedures, and continue to be an essential factor. The
notion of fairness in air traffic management is largely left implicit and there is no
well-defined set of principles that defines what constitutes a fair distribution of
resources.
This dissertation is motivated by the fairness issues that arise in the resource
allocation procedures that have been introduced under Collaborative Decision Mak-
ing (CDM). Fair rationing and allocation of available en-route time slots are two
major challenges that we address in this research.
The first challenge, fair rationing, is about how to compute a fair share of
available resources among agents, when the available resources fall below the total
demand. Since the demand, (flights), are time dependent, we introduce a new
rationing method that includes the time dependency of demand. The new procedure
gives every flight that is disrupted by an AFP a share of available resources. This
is in contrast to Ration-By-Schedule (RBS), the allocation method currently in use,
where later scheduled flights do not receive any slots. We will discuss and prove the
fairness properties of our novel rationing procedure.
The second challenge, allocation of en-route resources, is about how to allocate
resources among competitive agents, (flight operators), when each agent has different
preferences over resources, (time slots). We design four randomized procedures
for allocating scarce resources when the airlines’ preferences are included. These
procedures use an exogenous fair share, which can be computed using the method
described above, as a fairness standard for the allocation of slots among airlines.
The first two procedures, Preference Based Proportional Random Allocation
(PBPRA) and Modified-PBPRA, implicity assume equal weight for each time slot.
Compared to RBS, PBPRA and M-PBPRA reduce the total internal cost of airlines
and also assign each airline a number of slots close (in expectation) to their fair
share. The fairness, efficiency and incentive properties of PBPRA and M-PBPRA
are evaluated.
The value (or cost of delay) an airline associates with a particular flight may
vary substantially from flight to flight. Airlines who wish to receive priority for
certain flights usually are willing to pay more for specific time slots. To address the
need to express varying priorities, we propose two procedures, Dual Price Propor-
tional Random Allocation (DP-PRA) and Modified-DP-PRA (MDP-PRA) , that
assign dual prices to resources, i.e. time slots, in order to capture the airlines’ pref-
erences over delays, rerouting and cancelations. We explore the fairness, efficiency
and incentive properties of DP-PRA and MDP-PRA.
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The air transportation system in the United States is one of the most complex
logistical systems in the world. Each day, there are approximately 60,000 flights of
commercial, military and general aviation aircraft, and as many as 10,000 aircraft
may simultaneously occupy the airspace. Current projections expect air traffic to
grow at annual rate of 4% to 5% over the next 15 years. Besides the sheer volume,
the air transportation system gets more stressed by significant variation in airspace
capacity, due to factors such as fluctuating weather conditions and equipment out-
ages. Therefore, the coordination of air traffic requires a multitude of processes and
involves large number of stake holders.
To manage airspace congestion better, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has implemented a number of initiatives such as Miles-in-Trail(MIT), Ground
Delay Program(GDP) and Metering . However, when there is an en-route capacity
reduction due to severe weather, none of these initiatives are sufficient to address
extended capacity reductions in the airspace, and the need for additional tool has
been recognized. In the spring of 2006, the FAA proposed a new initiative called
the Airspace Flow Program (AFP) to allow more efficient, effective, equitable, and
predictable management of airborne traffic in congested airspace.
However, there are several potential weaknesses with the way traffic is handled
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today. Several Traffic Management Initiatives (TMI’s) can create excessive delay.
For example, Miles-In-Trail restrictions can propagate, resulting in longer restric-
tions; and rerouting is manually intensive, consuming controller time and attention
while giving little consideration to NAS customer input. To address these problems,
the Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) community has recognized a more col-
laborative and dynamic capability. The CDM Future Concepts Team (FCT) has
focused on the development of two concepts over the past several years to address
these needs; Integrated Collaborative Rerouting (ICR) and System Enhancements
for Versatile Electronic Negotiation (SEVEN). ICR is an enhanced, more collabo-
rative version of rerouting that involves customers early in the process and allows
them to submit preferences for reroutes. SEVEN is a longer-term concept that al-
lows much more collaboration between FAA traffic managers and NAS customers.
SEVEN extends and makes more robust the current practice of AFP’s while retain-
ing the present capabilities.
The typical approach to managing airspace congestion today can be described
as follows. When there is a reduction in enroute capacity due to sever weather, a
traffic management specialist using the TSD (Traffic Situation Display), can identify
a problem area by creating a Flow Constrained Area (FCA). The TFM specialists
at the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ATCSCC) can enter the capacity of the
FCA, expressed as the number of flights that can be managed per hour, and Flight
Schedule Monitor (FSM) will then assign each flight a controlled departure time
that will provide a smooth managed flow of traffic to the FCA. These departure
times are sent to the customers for their planning and to the towers at the depar-
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ture airports for enforcement. The AFP uses GDP like procedures such as Ration
By Schedule(RBS), which is based on the first-scheduled-first-served principle, for
resource rationing. However, GDP procedures implicitly assume all flights must be
assigned an arrival slot. On the other hand, in the AFP or SEVEN setting, all
flights on the demand list need not be granted access to the enroute resource.
There are important differences between resource allocation for GDPs and
enroute resource allocation. In the GDP setting, demand is established based on the
set of flights scheduled to arrive at the GDP airport. Since the authority to cancel
a flight rests with the flight operator and not the FAA, GDP planning procedures
must allocate a slot to all flights within the GDP demand list. Of course, in severe
situations, the FAA will be forced to assign extreme flight delays, which may de facto
necessitate the cancellation of certain flights. However, GDP procedures implicitly
assume all flights must be assigned an arrival slot. On the other hand,in the AFP
or SEVEN setting, all flights on the demand list need not be granted access to the
enroute resource. The flight operator has the prerogative to cancel flights not given
access or reroute such flights around the restricted airspace. Thus, enroute resource
allocation decision models must both determine which flights gain access and assign
an access time (slot) for those flights that do gain access.
1.1 Motivation
Fair allocation of available resources among airlines is very challenging when
there is a reduction in en-route resources. Fairness concerns have played an im-
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portant role throughout the development of allocation procedures, and continue to
be an essential factor whenever extensions or modifications to these procedures are
proposed.
Each airline will typically place a different relative weight on delays, rerouting
and cancellation. Whereas some airlines would like to preserve the on-time perfor-
mance for certain flights and cancel or reroute other flights, other airlines prefer to
have less rerouting and cancellation while tolerating higher total delay.
Using fairness principles as a basis for allocating scarce resources provides
our research with a novel focus. In fact, some proposals address the rationing of
airport arrival capacity in the long run. Using methods ranging from auctions [52]
and congestion pricing [50] to bargaining schemes [4]. The allocation of slots under
CDM is different, in that slots must be assigned on a daily basis due to fluctuation
in airport or en-route capacity. The dynamic nature of the allocation process makes
it more complicated and fairness plays an important role in this environment.
Our research focuses on the development of new fair enroute resource rationing
methods with specific emphasis on mechanisms for airspace flow programs. Our
objective is to include airline preferences for trading-off delay and rerouting.
1.2 Research Contribution and Outline
Chapter 2 presents an overview of air traffic management, especially manage-
ment of daily operations. We also explain the current air traffic flow management
initiatives employed by the FAA. The new concept System Enhancement for Ver-
4
satile Electronic Negotiation (SEVEN) will be explained. Both Airspace Flow Pro-
grams and SEVEN represent potential application domains for our research. We
present an overview of slot allocation methods and discuss how fairness and user
preferences play an important role in resource allocation.
Chapter 3 introduces a new way for fair rationing of resources, which in our
context is the problem of how to compute a fair share of available resources among
agents, when the available resources fall below the total demand. The new rationing
is designed to consider time-based resources, time slots, and time-dependent de-
mand, flights. The proposed rationing procedure is based on Proportional Random
Assignment. We adapted fairness concepts from the economics literature as a basis
of our rationing procedures. The key advantage of our proposed rationing algorithm
is that it considers all flights disrupted by an AFP, which means all flights receive a
positive share of available slots. However, it should be noted that the current policy
used in practice, Ration-By-Schedule (RBS), provides a slot assignment only to the
earliest disrupted flights so that later scheduled flights do not receive any slots in
an AFP. We develop the new rationing algorithm, and also we present experimental
results to compare it vs. RBS. Additionally, in order to investigate the fairness of
the proposed rationing algorithm, we analytically prove fairness properties such as
impartiality, consistency, equal treatment of equals, and demand monotonicity.
Chapter 4 introduces novel methods for allocation of limited resources, which
in our context is the problem of how to allocate resources among competitive agents,
(flight operators), when each agent, (airline), has a different preference over re-
sources, (time slots). We design two randomized methods for allocating scarce
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resources when the airlines’ preferences are included. They exploit an exogenous
fair share, which can be computed using the method described in the chapter 3, as
a fairness standard to drive the allocation. Our randomized procedures take into
account airline preference information, and they implicity assign equal weight to
each time slot. Key advantages of our algorithms are described: (1) they guarantee
that the total number of slots any carrier receives is between the floor and ceiling of
their fair share; (2) they assign each carrier a number of slots close (in expectation)
to their fair share; (3) they reduce the total internal cost of each carrier compared to
the existing resource allocation procedure, RBS. Our two proposed algorithms are
compared experimentally vs. each other and their fairness, efficiency and incentive
properties are analytically derived. We discuss the shortcomings of RBS, and we
compare the performance of our algorithms with RBS based on data derived from
a real application.
Chapter 5 defines and analysis two new alternative randomized allocation algo-
rithms that employ richer agent preference information. The value (or cost of delay)
an airline associates with a particular flight may vary substantially from flight to
flight. Airlines who wish to receive priority for certain flights usually are willing to
pay more for specific time slots. To accommodate richer carrier preferences so that
airlines can express the relative importance of delays, rerouting and cancelations,
new concepts of slot values and dual pricing are introduced. A key advantage of
these methods is the sophistication that they provide to carriers for capturing their
preferred slots. This provides flexibility to carriers to achieve their goals; and also
allows carriers to receive “premium” slots for an extra “charge”. The two designed
6
algorithms are compared vs. each other and their fairness, efficiency and incentive
properties are analytically derived. We analyze the performance of the new methods
and compare them with RBS based on based on data derived from a real application.




The air transportation system in the United States is one of the most complex
logistical systems in the world. Each day, there are approximately 60,000 flights of
commercial, military and general aviation aircraft, and as many as 10,000 aircraft
may simultaneously occupy the airspace. Besides the sheer volume, the air trans-
portation system gets more stressed by significant variation in airspace capacity, due
to factors such as fluctuating weather conditions and equipment outages. Therefore,
the coordination of air traffic requires a multitude of processes and involves large
number of stake holders.
This chapter presents a general overview of Air Traffic Management with par-
ticular focus on Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) initiatives. We explain at a
high level the characteristics of various initiatives. Next, we describe the importance
of fair allocation of scarce resources in ATFM [8]. Finally, we explain the motivation
behind this research.
2.1 Introduction
Air Traffic Management (ATM) consists of two major components. Air Traf-
fic Flow Management (ATFM) and Air Traffic Control (ATC). ATC consists of
processes that provide tactical separation services, that is, real-time separation pro-
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cedures for collision detection and avoidance. Thus, ATC primarily addresses im-
mediate safety concerns of airborne flights. On the other hand, Air Traffic Flow
Management (ATFM) includes all activities related to the management of the flow
of aircraft and related system resources from “block to block”, including strategic
system management of airport arrival and departure capacities, tactical enroute flow
management, near-terminal area flow management, and ground traffic flow manage-
ment. As such, ATC actions are of a more “microscopic” nature and have a very
short time horizon. The aim of ATFM is to resolve a capacity imbalances by ad-
justing aggregate traffic flows to match scarce resources.
Odoni [49] classified the Air Traffic Flow Management into three different
category: Long, Medium and Short-term:
• Long-Term approaches are mainly focused on increasing the capacity. This
can be done by constructing a new airport or a runway at an existing airports.
Such initiatives are usually very costly and subject to strict environmental
regulations. Thus they may be difficult to implement.
• Medium-Term approaches are more administrative or economic and try to
alleviate congestion by modifying spatial or temporal traffic patterns. For in-
stance, at some airports flight schedules are coordinated bi-annually according
to IATA guidelines [37]. Recent proposal suggests the use of slot auctions and
congestion pricing [49].
• Short-Term approaches mainly try to make adjustments to air traffic flows
to match demand with available capacity. Such short-term plans usually are
9
performed a few hours in advance of predictable disruptions (usually caused
by bad weather).
In the next section, we review the ATFM short-term initiatives. Through this
dissertation, we use ATFM to refer to only short-term initiatives.
2.2 Air Traffic Flow Management Initiatives
The primary task of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. Air
Navigator Service produce, is to enforce the proper separation requirement in the
controlled airspace. The United States air space has been divided to 22 areas. The
Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs) are responsible for aircraft separation
within each area. Each ARTCC is divided to 20 to 80 smaller areas called sectors.
Air Traffic Controllers (ATCs) guide aircrafts from one sector to another until they
arrive within almost 200 miles from their destination airports. A controller is only
responsible for the movement of aircraft within a specific sector and decisions are
based on nearly real-time flight information when the flight enters the sector. There
is coordination between controllers at adjacent sectors by transferring the responsi-
bility for an aircraft when it passes sector boundaries. Finally, the control of aircraft
is assumed by Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities (TRACONs). The air-
port towers control aircraft while they taxi to and from runways and during takeoffs
and landings.
The FAA uses the Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) at the Air
Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) and major Terminal Radar
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Approach Control (TRACON) facilities to manage the flow of air traffic within the
National Airspace System (NAS). Other organizations (e.g., the airlines, Depart-
ment of Defense, NASA, and international sites) also have access to the ETMS
software and/or data. The ETMS provides Traffic Management Specialists with
tools such as Traffic Situation Display (TSD), and traffic counts for airspace sec-
tors, airports, and fixes. The ATCSCC continuously monitors current and projected
demand within the NAS. Whenever it is predicted that demand will exceed capacity
limits for at least a 15 minutes duration, FAA regulation mandates a response. In
that case, the ARTSCC generates and implements strategies to resolve the prob-
lem. The ATFM procedures that are used most often are ground delay programs or
ground stops , flow constraint area/ flow evaluation area, metering, rerouting and
recently air space flow programs(AFP’s); there is also a new concept called Sys-
tem Enhancements for Versatile Electronic Negotiation (SEVEN) . We give a brief
introduction to these initiatives in the following sections.
2.2.1 Ground Delay Program
Each airport is constrained by the rate at which they can land arriving air-
crafts. Generally, when airports operate under normal circumstances, the scheduled
aircraft flow does not exceed the arrival rate. But circumstances, most usually
poor weather conditions, can lower the arrival rate so that the expected number of
arriving aircrafts exceeds the capacity of the airport. In these circumstances, the
ATCSCC reacts by issuing a Ground Delay Program (GDP). A GDP issues depar-
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ture delay to aircraft expected to arrive at the constrained airport. These ground
delays are less costly and safer than airborne delays that would result without such
actions.
Flights destined for the affected airport are issued Controlled Departure Times
(CDT) at their points of departure. Flights that have been issued CDTs are not
permitted to depart until their Controlled Departure Times. These CDTs are cal-
culated in such a way as to meter the rate that traffic arrives at the affected airport,
ensuring that demand is equal to the acceptance rate. The length of delays that
result from the implementation of a GDP is a function of two factors: how much
greater than the acceptance rate the original demand was, and for what length of
time the original demand was expected to exceed the acceptance rate.
A Ground Stop (GS) is closely related to a GDP. When there is an unexpected
problem at an airport, e.g. a runway closure, the ATCSCC will stop all inbound
traffic , i.e. indefinitely delay their departure, to reduce traffic flows. When ground
stops become excessive or delay can be foreseen, a regular GDP often follows a
ground stop.
2.2.2 Flow Constraint Area/ Flow Evaluation Area
The Traffic Situation Display (TSD) and the Common Constraint Situation
Display (CCSD) provide traffic managers and flight dispatchers with the ability to
define and display FEAs and/or FCAs. An FEA/FCA is a user-defined volume of
airspace along with associated flight lists and filters. FEAs and FCAs are used to
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show areas where the traffic flow should be evaluated or where initiatives should
be taken due to severe weather or volume constraints. Traffic managers or flight
dispatchers define a geographic area of an FEA or an FCA by drawing a polygon
or a line on the display and defining the ceiling and floor of the FEA/FCA using
a dialog box. Alternatively, an FEA/FCA tool user can designate a NAS element
as an FEA/FCA (e.g., a fix, an airport, a sector, or a TRACON). The tool user
also defines criteria for filtering the flights that are predicted to intersect the drawn
FEA/FCA (e.g., by airports, by center traversed, or by departure or arrival points).
The FEA/FCA tool user also defines a time period for the FEA/FCA (maximum of
23 hours). It is useful here to distinguish FEAs from FCAs. A Flow Evaluation Area
(FEA) is a two dimensional line or three-dimensional volume of airspace, along with
filters and time boundaries, used to identify flights associated with a potential (or
actual) constraint. FEAs can be built by Traffic Management Coordinators (TMCs)
at Traffic Management Units (TMUs), Traffic Management Specialists (TMSs) at
the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC), or by flight dispatchers
at various flight operations centers (using CCSD). A Flow Constrained Area (FCA)
is an FEA subject to an actual constraint. FCAs are built by the ATCSCC and
require a traffic management initiative (TMI); for example, a reroute. Any FEA
tool user can create “private” FEAs for viewing on their workstation to monitor
traffic flows and evolving traffic flow situations. If it is determined that a develop-
ing constraint situation may impact any system stakeholder, an FEA/FCA tool user
can create a “Shared FEA” in order to exchange information and facilitate collab-
oration with other system stakeholders. At this point, some voluntary action may
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be suggested and taken by stakeholders to help avoid a more drastic requirement or
reroute initiative. The idea is to solicit “Operational Intent” information in order
for Traffic Managers to assess whether more restrictive initiatives are warranted.
Intent data can be submitted by NAS customers through the CCSD. [33]
2.2.3 Metering and Rerouting
Metering operations are mostly used in the context of en route Traffic Flow
Management (TFM). There are two kinds of metering: the first, time-based me-
tering, which controls the time at which an aircraft is to pass over the certain
geographical point. Second, distance-based metering, which is better known as
“Miles-in-Trail”(MIT) restriction. A MIT specifies a minimum separation (in miles)
between aircraft moving across an airspace way point.
The primary use of time-based metering is to regulate flows into the terminal
area of an airport. Here, time-based metering efficiently spaces aircraft for final
approach. On the other hand, MIT restrictions are typically into a congested portion
of enroute airspace (or terminal area) [35].
When bad weather is forecast to impact accessibility to a certain region of
airspace, rerouting can be used as an option. Severe Weather Avoidance Procedures
(SWAP) are applied to deal with such conditions. SWAP plans usually have a
major impact on air traffic, including metering restrictions and/or GDP’s along
with rerouting and/or AFP.
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2.2.4 Airspace Flow Programs
When there is a capacity reduction due to the severe weather, rerouting flights
is not sufficient to address extended capacity reductions in the airspace, and the
need for additional tools has long been recognized. To meet that need the FAA
introduced a new capability in the spring of 2006. The Airspace Flow Program
(AFP) combines the power of GDP’s and FCAs to allow more efficient, effective,
equitable, and predictable management of airborne traffic in congested airspace.
When TFM specialists at the ATCSCC, in consultation with FAA field man-
agers and customer representatives, decide that the weather conditions are appro-
priate they can plan and deploy an AFP. The first step is to use the Traffic Situation
Display (TSD) to examine predicted weather and traffic patterns and identify the
problem area by creating an FCA.
The Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) takes the FCA descrip-
tion and produces a list of the flights that are expected to pass through the FCA and
the time they are expected to enter. This list, updated with fresh information every
five minutes, is sent to the Flight Schedule Monitor (FSM), which displays the pro-
jected demand in a number of formats designed to support effective planning. FSM
creates a common situational awareness among all users and service providers in the
National Airspace System. All parties need to be aware of NAS constraints in order
to make collaborative air traffic decisions. It is designed to effectively interact with
existing FAA systems, FSM displays the Aggregate Demand List (ADL) informa-
tion for both airport and airspace data elements for its users, which means everyone
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is looking at the same picture.. The TFM specialists at the ATCSCC can enter the
capacity of the FCA, expressed as the number of flights that can be managed per
hour, and FSM will then assign each flight a controlled departure time so that the
flow into the FCA does not exceed the declared capacity. These departure times are
sent to the customers for flight planning and to the towers at the departure airports
for enforcement.
The principal goal for the initial deployment of the AFP program is to bet-
ter manage en route traffic during severe weather events. Compared to previous
approaches, AFP’s reduce unnecessary delays while providing better control of de-
mand, more equity, and more flexibility for customers [43].
2.2.5 System Enhancements for Versatile Electronic Negotiation
As we mentioned in previous sections, the FAA has implemented a number of
initiatives to manage airspace congestion better. However, a remaining shortcoming
is the inability of carriers to express preferences based on their business needs. To
manage en route congestion better and enable National Airspace System (NAS)
customers to submit sets of alternative trajectory options for their flights, the CDM
Future Concepts Team (FCT) has focused on the development of two concepts over
the past several years to address these needs; Integrated Collaborative Rerouting
(ICR) and System Enhancements for Versatile Electronic Negotiation (SEVEN).
ICR is an enhanced, more collaborative version of rerouting that involves cus-
tomers early in the process and allows them to submit preferences for reroutes.
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Initial ICR capabilities were deployed with Enhanced Traffic Management System
(ETMS) version 8.3 (Fall 2006). SEVEN is a longer-term concept that allows much
more collaboration between FAA traffic managers and NAS customers.
There are two main enabling concepts in SEVEN:
1. Customers can submit prioritized lists of route options
2. Traffic managers create Interactive Dynamic Flight Lists (IDFL’s) that allow
them to monitor key system resources
The first concept is extremely flexible, customers can include any option they
like and can submit this list at any time. They can submit not only different physical
routes, but different temporal routes as well. That is, they can adjust the times they
are willing to fly certain routes or submit the same route flown at different times as
options. SEVEN adds a default last choice option of ground delay. Thus there are
always options in the system, and even without participation from the customers
SEVEN falls back to an AFP-like Traffic Management Initiative.
The second main concept in SEVEN is its instrument control mechanism.
Traffic managers create Interactive Dynamic Flight Lists (IDFL’s) that allow them
to monitor key system resources and adjust the demand on these resources quickly as
conditions change. They do this by choosing flights to allow or disallow in the FCA,
rather than manually rerouting flights. The IDFL provides an interface from which
to do this, either by choosing flights manually or by automatically suggesting flights
for the traffic manager. This functionality is combined with monitoring capability,
condensing these traffic management tools into a single interface. This ability to
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monitor and alter demand without worrying about individual reroutes gives traffic
managers finer and more efficient control over resource allocation [34].
The basic steps of SEVEN are explained as follows. These are not necessarily
sequential steps, but rather elements of the concept which may occur at different
times during operation.
1. Customers submit prioritized lists of route options. They submit this
list to the Traffic Management System (TMS). If they so choose, they may
edit the list at any time, because of changing weather conditions or changing
priorities. Potentially, customers will develop their own software to automat-
ically create the lists. Currently, customers can file a single route and they
have no control over weather or not it is accepted. If a situation arises in
which they cannot fly their current route, not only do they have little input
into their reroutes, but the burden of finding and choosing reroute options is
on the traffic manager.
2. Traffic managers identify areas of interest by creating IDFL’s. When
a region of airspace might become congested, traffic managers at the ARTCC
Traffic Management Unit (TMU), in collaboration with the ATCSCC, estab-
lish an FEA or FCA. Traffic managers share the FEA/FCA with the cus-
tomers, along with any additional constraints, remarks, and route guidance.
Once the constrained area is defined, traffic managers generate an IDFL iden-
tifying the flights with current routes that take them through the constrained
area. IDFL’s are dynamic and updated as changes occur. The IDFL dis-
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plays the pertinent data about these flights, including ACID (Aircraft ID),
current state, origin, destination, entry and exit time, altitude, and any other
data deemed necessary. The IDFL updates dynamically to reflect the changes
made either by the traffic manager or by the customers. As route options are
adjusted, flights will appear on or disappear from the list in real time. Once
the IDFL is created, traffic managers monitor the demand and the next step
is enacted.
3. Customers receive notification for flights on the IDFL. Once traffic
managers generate or share an IDFL, dispatchers are notified that their flights
are to be subject to the constraint associated with the IDFL. If a customer
has not loaded any options, they are notified that they are at risk of taking
ground delay if they are moved. This message also notifies dispatchers of the
potential ground delay time.
4. Traffic managers dynamically adjust demand up or down and choose
flights to move on or off the IDFL. Traffic managers have the ability
to adjust the demand on a constrained area. The capacity is dynamic, and
can change over time. Once the capacity is determined, the traffic managers
meet the capacity by checking or unchecking flights to allow or disallow them
from the constrained area, using their own operational knowledge to deter-
mine those flights which would have the least impact, be least affected by
their moving, or other criteria determined to be best. Equity and efficiency
concerns play a large role in this decision. Once a flight is removed from the
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IDFL, it is moved to its highest priority option that does not intersect the
constraint. In addition to manually selecting flights, IDFLs have a built in
function which traffic managers can use to adjust demand. Traffic managers
specify a reduction/expansion in demand to match capacity and rationing
algorithms automatically choose flights to remove from the IDFL. Once the
autosuggest function produces a recommended solution, traffic managers can
preview the solution and accept, reject, or fine tune it.
5. Automation assigns reroutes or ground delay for flights selected to
move. Once traffic managers select flights for removal, each moved flight is
automatically rerouted to its highest priority option which takes it out of the
constrained area (which may be ground delay). The system retains the route
option list, and customers can still update the list.
6. Traffic manages and ATCSCC monitor multiple constraints. In some
cases, such as a widespread weather pattern, traffic managers must create mul-
tiple IDFL’s simultaneously. In such situations, there may be IDFL’s interact-
ing or covering multiple sectors. These would require coordination amongst the
traffic managers responsible, as well as the ATCSCC. The ATCSCC special-
ists would monitor and control interactions amongst IDFL’s, detect conflicts
and redundant constraints, assign control in cases where an IDFL covered an
area spanning multiple centers or sectors, and any other coordination needed
amongst ARTCC’s.
SEVEN extends and makes more robust the current practice of AFPs while
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retaining the present capabilities. In the absence of user submitted routing options,
SEVEN emulates an AFP, but with options, SEVEN opens up a far more flexible
set of capabilities that automatically work around constraints to maximize flow and
minimize reaction time. In the IDFL, traffic managers are given a powerful tool to
control the situation as much or as little as is necessary. This control is exerted
without introducing excessive complexity into the controller environment. One of
the most significant benefits of SEVEN is the ability to recapture system capacity
that is currently lost when severe weather (or other capacity limiting factors) does
not materialize as predicted. Traffic managers can handle uncertainty in both ca-
pacity and demand more easily as SEVEN makes it easy to quickly adapt to the
situation as it unfolds [34].
2.2.6 Interaction
While the FAA is concerned about aggregate flows and capacity limits, the
ultimate goal of airlines is to maintain their published flight schedule, which reflects
its competitive strategy. Typically, Airlines coordinate their daily operation at cen-
tralized Airline Operational Control Centers (AOC’s), which interact with airports,
maintenance stations and pilots. Airline operations require a high degree of co-
ordination, because of potential propagation effects of flight delays. This presents
a challenge when airlines face irregular operations, usually caused by the need to
respond to ATFM restrictions imposed by the FAA. The important functions that
need to be performed by AOC’s are schedule adjustment, flight planning and dis-
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patch and flight monitoring ([1],[35]).
Any unpredicted events, such as delay or mechanical problems, may cause
flight schedule disruption. To prevent the cascading of delays, the AOC’s will adjust
operations to return to more balanced conditions. This may be done by delaying a
single flight, relocating the resources (aircraft, crew, airport arrival slots), canceling
flights or creating flights to balance the schedule. Balancing the schedule may be
interpreted differently by individual airlines: one airline’s objective might be the
ability to back to the normal schedule be the next day, while another might keep as
many of its schedule flights as possible [35].
To minimize the cost, one important aspect of airline operations is to determine
flight route and payload. Aircraft type, winds, complex trade-offs among speed,
altitude, payload and fuel load, all will affect the choice of route.
The AOC’s monitor all aspect of flights in progress, such as ensuring flights
stay within safe and legal limits, assessing weather conditions (en route and arrival
airport), and helping crews in solving problems that may arise.
It is necessary to have significant coordination between a number of stake
holders on the side of the FAA and the airlines. On the FAA’s side, the ATC-
SCC predicts aggregate traffic flows and monitors current and projected capacity
limits and demands. The ATCSCC usually initiates GDP’s, SWAP’s and AFP’s
and coordinates these ATFM initiatives with traffic management units at various
Air Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs), Terminal Radar Approach Control facilities
(TRACON’s) and towers. Also, when the ATCSCC predicts a sustained period of
congestion, it responds to it with ATFM initiative, which is communicated to airlines
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AOC’s. Typically, these plans are formulated two to four hours in advance. The
ARTCC’s, TRANCON’s and Towers also interact to coordinate air traffic between
their regions. They delegate responsibilities to the individual air traffic controllers.
The controllers at adjacent sectors interact to transfer the control of aircraft. On
the airlines’ side, the AOC’s primary task is to coordinate the daily operations,
such as gate assignment, maintenance, and flight dispatch. They employ constant
communication with pilots to control and monitor the progress of individual flights.
2.3 Decentralized Air Traffic Management
As air traffic increases, significant change in ATM will be required. Airlines
often believe that the restrictions implemented by the FAA are overly severe, so that
unnecessary delays, congestion, and costs for the airlines result. The traditional
approach largely followed is a central planning paradigm, in which users have to
adhere to ATC decisions. The national air transportation system is moving toward
an unprecedented, paradigm-shifting change. The next 10 years promise to be a
pivotal time in the history of air transportation that will change the face of aviation.
It is called the Next Generation Air Transportation System NextGen for short and
it will forever redefine the management of national airspace system (NAS). To meet
future demand, there must be a comprehensive system upgrade that will allow a
fundamental change in the way that air traffic is managed. NextGen will enable
critical transitions:
• From ground based to satellite based navigation and surveillance
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• From voice communications to digital data exchange
• From a disparate and fragmented weather forecast delivery system to a system
that uses a single, authoritative source
• From operations limited by visibility to sustaining the pace of operations even
when impacted by adverse weather or difficult terrain.
Most significant, however, is the one transition that makes all the others pos-
sible moving from disconnected and incompatible information systems to a scalable,
network centric architecture. This will ensure that everyone using the system has
easy access to the same information at the same time, when needed. NextGen intro-
duces new analytic tools that more pro actively detect adverse trends and identify
precursors. These tools will allow to act on potential problems before they take
shape. In addition, airports will benefit from increased safety, better use of existing
capacity, greater design flexibility, and reduced environmental impacts. New tech-
nologies, standards, and procedures, in addition to new airside infrastructure, will
allow airports to realize the benefits of NextGen [32].
2.3.1 Collaborative Decision Making
Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) was initially conceived in the mid 1990s
within the FAA Airline Data Exchange (FADE) project. Under CDM, the AOC’s
have a significant decision making responsibilities about resource allocation and
traffic flow management (for more information about CDM see [9], [11], [73]). The
initial implementation of CDM, was focused on the development of new operational
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procedures and decision support tools for implementing and managing GDP’s.
2.3.1.1 GDP’s under CDM
The process of issuing GDP’s had existed before the Collaborative Decision
Making project got started. But the old system had many short comings that led
to inefficiencies in the use of the valuable arrival resources.
Under the old model for running a GDP, called Grover Jack, flights were allo-
cated slots by a priority based on their latest estimated time of arrival. This implied
that if an airline reported a delay, then that airline would be a larger total ground
delay than the airline did not share the information. This concept was referred to
as the “double penalty”. In addition, any canceled flights were not allocated arrival
slots. It was in the airlines’ best interests not to report a cancellation, wait until
the GDP was issued, then cancel the flight and substitute another flight up to the
vacant slot. To address this problem, a new algorithm was formulated called Ra-
tion By Schedule (RBS). Flights are now prioritized based on their original schedule
times, even if they are canceled or delayed. If a delayed flight is given an arrival slot
earlier that its delayed time, the airlines can use the substitution process to swap
another of their flights into the earlier slot. Also, RBD is a new proposed algorithm
[12] that prioritized flights based on their distance to the GDP airport.
Another problem was that very often valuable arrival slots were going unused
occasionally during a GDP. An airline had to cancel a flight but was unable to sub-
stitute another of its flights into the vacant slot. There had been no mechanism to
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fill in these holes in the schedule. This has been addressed by the Compression al-
gorithm. This is a rule-based algorithm that expands the idea of substitution across
airlines. The algorithm processes each slot, which is open due to flight cancellation
or delay. It first tries to find a flight operated by the same carrier to move up into
the vacated slot. If one does not exist, the slot is then opened to the next available
flight that can move up, regardless of which carrier operate the flight. The process
continues, meanwhile always checking after each slot move to see whether the airline
that owns the slot can now take the advantage of it. Compression results in reduc-
tion or no change to each flight’s delay. This has proved to be a win-win concepts
for both the FAA and airlines [10, 11, 70, 71].
The Ground Holding Problem (GHP) was first introduced in scientific litera-
ture by Odoni [49]. The GHP in its basic version [60] requires additional assumptions
such as, discrete time horizon, deterministic demand and deterministic capacity. At
the beginning of the planning horizon we need, a fixed and finite time period which
has been discretized into contiguous time periods (slots), a complete list of flights
bound to arrive at the congested airport and the airport arrival capacity in each
time period. If F , S are the set of flights and the set of available slots, xfs ∈ {0, 1}
for f ∈ F and s ∈ S is the integer decision variable for assigning a slots to a flight.
Cf (d) is cost of assigning delay d to flight f , the capacity do each slot is considered
to be one. Let ts be the time of slot s and af the scheduled arrival time of flight f .
The GHP can be formulated as an Integer Programming (IP) problem as:
Min
∑




s∈S,ts≥af xfs = 1 ∀f ∈ F
∑
f∈F ,ts≥af xfs ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ S
This version of the GHP was studied in [7, 49]. More research on the GHP
can be found in [6, 13, 35, 53, 54, 61, 70, 71]. The form of the delay cost in objective
function is an important issue and most models employ a function in which marginal
cost increases as a function of delay.
When airlines face a GDP, they respond to resulting schedule disruptions by
trading-off flight cancellations and delays to minimize the cost of the disruption.
Disruptions in flight schedules may have a cascading effect. To overcome this prob-
lem, airlines may cancel flights and substitute flight-slot assignments. The models
that discuss resolving schedule disruption through slot swapping are proposed in
[36, 40, 41, 48, 68]. Other models ([15, 24, 25, 58, 59, 62, 63]) attempt to find an
operable, system-balanced flight schedule, that is they consider an airline’s entire
network of flights.
2.4 Slot Allocation
During severe weather, when there is a reduction in the en-route capacity,
traffic management specialist using the TSD (Traffic Situation Display), can identify
a problem area by creating a Flow Constrained Area (FCA). The TFM specialists at
the ATCSCC can enter the capacity of the FCA, expressed as the number of flights
that can be managed per hour, and FSM will then assign each flight a controlled
departure time that will provide a smooth managed flow of traffic to the FCA. These
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departure times are sent to the customers for their planning and to the towers at
the departure airports for enforcement.
Each airline will typically place a different relative weight on delays, rerouting
and cancellation. Whereas some airlines would like to preserve the on-time per-
formance for certain flights and cancel or reroute many other flights, other airlines
prefer to have less rerouting and cancellations while tolerating higher total delay.
Since the en-route capacity is reduced the fair allocation of available resources
among airlines arises. Fairness concerns have played an important role throughout
the development of allocation procedures, and continue to be an essential factor
whenever extensions or modifications to these procedures are proposed. The notion
of fairness in ATM is largely left implicit in the procedures. Howevr, some recent
research has developed fairness metrics and used these within TFM optimization
models that tradeoff fairness and efficiency (see [12], [70], [71]).
The use of fairness as a basis for allocating scarce resources presents is a
principal focus of our research. In fact, some proposals address the rationing of
airport arrival capacity in the long run using methods ranging from auctions [52]
and congestion pricing [50] to bargaining schemes [4]. The allocation of slots under
CDM is different, in that slots have to be assigned on daily basis due to fluctuation
in airport or en-route capacity. Fairness plays an important role in this environment.
Our research focuses on the development of a fair resource allocation mecha-
nism for an airspace flow program. Our objective is to include airlines preferences
for trading-off delay and rerouting. In our allocation procedures, each airline has
been assigned a limited budget. We analyze our procedures using fairness principles.
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The next chapter discusses the rationing of enroute resources. We propose a
new resource rationing method that is designed specifically for our problem. We
discuss the fairness of their new procedure.
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Chapter 3
Computing a Fair Share of Limited Resources
3.1 Introduction
The FAA introduced a new capability in the spring of 2006 known as the
Airspace Flow Program (AFP) that combines the power of Ground Delay Programs
(GDP’s) and Flow Constrained Areas (FCAs) to allow more efficient, effective, eq-
uitable, and predictable management of airborne traffic in congested airspace. The
principal goal for the initial deployment was to provide enhanced en route traffic
management during severe weather events.
In this research, we investigate a methodology to allocate available time slots
among carriers according to their preferences during the AFP. For example, one
carrier may want to increase its on time performance of certain flights, but reroute
more of its other flights while another carrier may be less concerned with the flight
delay, but prefer less rerouting, i.e. access to the FCA by more flights. Our model
assumes an air traffic service provider (FAA) seeks to assign the available time slots
among the carriers fairly while considering their preferences.
As discussed, the problem we address arises due to a capacity reduction in
a section of airspace for a period of time. Based on flight plans, each flight has a
scheduled arrival time at the boundary of the FCA. Since there is a reduction in
the capacity of part of the airspace, it is not feasible for all flights whose scheduled
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arrival time at the boundary of the FCA during that period of time to continue in
their preferred route and go through the FCA. Therefore, some of flights must be
rerouted. The challenge is which flights get rerouted and which flight pass through
the FCA. In this chapter, we propose a fair allocation method to determine a fair
share for each flight operator from available time slots. These fair shares will then
serve as allocation standards in the subsequent slot allocation processes developed
in chapters 4 and 5.
In the section 3.2, we review the literature on fair division of resources. Our
problem is described in section 3.3. In section 3.4 a method to determine the fair
share of carriers from available slots will be explained. Section 3.5 describes the
properties of our fair share methods. Experimental results based on our procedure
is provided in section 3.6. Finally, conclusions are given in the section 3.7.
3.2 Background
The problem of sharing somehow “fairly” a given amount of resources is per-
haps the oldest one faced by the economists. Brams’ books ([19, 20]) are full of
examples about divisions of goods. The fair division problem is simply stated in
general terms: given a set Ω, given n individuals and given some fairness require-
ments, find an opportune division. The challenge of dividing indivisible goods has
been studied in the literature [18, 22, 5].
When studying a simple model for the allocation of homogeneous indivisible
units of a commodity, the problem can be posed either as a rationing or a scheduling
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“story”. The various models of the rationing problem have been addressed in [51,
75, 76] for divisible goods and in [31, 27] for discrete items. Allocating resources in
proportion to individual claims is the oldest formal rule of distributive justice. In
case of indivisibility, the probabilistic rationing method gives an expected share to
an agent proportional to his claim [44, 57]. The method meets the axiom of equity,
consistency and equal treatment of equals. In the proportional random allocation
method [44], the assumption is all items are homogeneous.
Two simple scheduling methods are discussed in the queuing literature. The
proportional method seeks to treat equally each unit of claim [47]. In other words,
the t-th unit goes to an agent with a probability proportional to unsatisfied demand.
The fair queuing method solves this problem by allocating one unit per agent,
irrespective of the size of individual demand, in a successive round-robin fashion.
In each round the active agents (whose demands is not yet fully met) are randomly
ordered (with uniform probability) and served one job in that order [46].
The problem of fair division when agents have heterogeneous preferences over
the objects is studied as well. The division problem with single-peaked preferences is
introduced in [55]. A considerable number of papers consider the ordinal extension
of preferences e.g. [2, 17, 28, 30]. In those papers a probabilistic approach to
the problem of assigning objects to the agents is suggested. The main normative
requirement in mechanism design for dividing objects among agents with preference
over the objects are efficiency and strategy-proofness; neither concept applies to
the preference-free environment. In the full preference domain ([38, 16]), when the
number of objects is equal to the number of agents, probabilistic rules are proposed
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based on a deterministic assignment.
In our problem, we face two difficulties. First, when the FAA as a coordinator
must decide about each carrier’s share, the underlying good, a time-slot, is not
homogeneous in nature. The second difficulty is how to include carriers’ preference
in the assignment problem. In the following section we address the first difficulty
while we try to meet fairness principles. The second difficulty is addressed in later
chapters.
3.3 Problem Description
During severe weather events, reduction in en-route capacity can lead to a
reduction in the number of flights that can pass through a portion of airspace.
The traffic flow management (TFM) specialists at the air traffic control systems
command center (ATCSCC) enter an FCA capacity, expressed as the number of
flights that can be managed per hour, and then the decision support tool, FSM,
assigns each flight a controlled departure time so that the flow into the FCA does
not exceed the declared capacity.
In our research we assume that flights pass the boundary of FCA one at a time
(this is consistent with current practice). Therefore we can express the capacity as
the number of available time slots. We consider those flights that are “scheduled” to
arrive at the boundary of FCA. Such a flight schedule can be derived based on each
flights scheduled departure time and filed flight plan. Employing such a schedule
can be problematic as it is not immune to gaming or strategic behavior on the part
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of flight operators.
For example, it could be worthwhile for a flight operator to file flight plans
through the FCA, even though these are not the best routes for those flights. Such
flights could improve that flight operators fair share. Later, these “extra” flights
could be rerouted onto their most preferred trajectories. Our use of these schedules
is consistent with current practice- we view finding an alternative standard as an
open research question.
The fair share for each carrier can be found in many different ways. A principal
goal we seek is to provide equity among carriers. The allocation of homogeneous
demands, when the total demand exceeds total available resources is addressed in
[51, 75, 76] and, in the case of scheduling problems, is treated in [47, 44, 46, 69](these
models correspond to the situation in which all flights arrive at the beginning of
the AFP). Vossen [69] uses a heterogeneous demand model to treat the different
arrival times of flights. To allocate slots to flights, he uses “proportional random
assignment” which randomly assigns slots to the carriers in proportion to the number
of a carrier’s flights that can use a slot. In his method, slots sequentially are assigned
to the carriers. The proportional random assignment method is a random allocation
method. It gives one feasible solution of flights-slots assignment. As we can see,
the procedure is time dependent. In the “proportional random allocation” method
proposed by Moulin [44] there is no time dependency, which means that all agents
can participate in the lottery at each time till their demand is met. In proportional
random assignment, agents participate in the lottery if they can use the slot. We can
use this method as a way to assign a fair share to each flight [66] (correspondingly
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each carrier). We will explain in the next section how to determine the fair share of
each flight from available slots.
3.4 Determining Fair Share of Available Slots for Each Carrier
The goal of this section is to determine a fair share of available slots owed to
each operator in expectation. We now define notation that we will use in this and
later chapters.
Let F = {f1, f2, . . . , fn} be the set of flights and S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm} be the
set of available slots (m < n) during the AFP. The capacity, cj, of each slot sj is
considered one. Suppose there are K carriers A = {A1, A2, ...AK}, and Fi is the set
of flights of carrier Ai such that
• Fi ⊂ F
• Fi ∩ Fj = φ ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ K, i 6= j
• ∪Ki=1Fi = F
af is the time flight f is scheduled to arrive at the boundary of FCA and tj is the
time of slot sj. Flight f can be assigned to any slots sj with tj ≥ af .
Our objective is to find each carrier’s fair share from the available slots. It
should be emphasized that the models and axioms we introduce here are based on
the those proposed in the [44, 46, 69].
From the point of view of our allocation philosophy, two flights are equivalent
if they have the same af . Thus, we refer to the af values as type designators (τf )
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and say two flights are the same type if they have the same af value (τf = af ). Let
τ ∈ NF+ be the vector of all flight types; associated with each set of flights F there








xf,j = 1 ∀ 0 ≤ j < m,
∑
tj≥τf




Where the first constraint,
∑
f∈F xf,j = 1 ∀ 0 ≤ j < m, implies that all available
slots are used, and the second constraint,
∑
tj≥τf xf,j ≤ 1 ∀f ∈ F , assigns a flight
to at most one slot.
For a given feasible set Q, any f ∈ F , and any slot index j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m, we
define the reduced feasible set Q(f, j) as follow:
Q(f, j) = {x ∈ Q : xf,j = 1}




f∈F xf,j = 1 ∀ 0 ≤ j < m, the constraint that assigns all
slots, and
∑
tj≥τf xf,j ≤ 1 ∀f ∈ F , the constraint that assigns at most one flight
to any slot, it can easily be seen that, in order for all slots to be used, for any given
slot time, the total number of slots up to that time must be less than or equal to the
total number of flights that can use those slots. In other words, if Fj = {f : af ≤ tj}
then |Fj| ≥ j for all j. If this condition does not hold, then it is not possible to
assign flights to all slots.
Therefore, we must “decompose” the set of flights-slots such that this condition
holds. We define the decomposition procedure as follows:
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Decomposition:
Step 0: Inputs: Set of flights F , set of slots S = {s1, s2, ..., sm}, j = 1
Step 1: while j ≤ m Do:
Step 1a: Fj = {f : af ≤ tj} if |Fj| < j then delete sj
Step 1b: j = j + 1
end while
This deletes ”excess” slots. It should be noted that we call the resultant flight-slot
non-decomposable but what the procedure really does is slot deletion.
We use a non-decomposable set of flights-slots to compute the fair share and
also, as we will see in the later sections, to allocate slots to flights. From now on,we
assume the set of flights-slots is not decomposable.
An allocation problem consists of a tuple (τ, Q), where τ represents the types
for flights in F . A probabilistic allocation rule P associates with each allocation
problem (τ, Q), a random allocation in the feasible set Q. Thus, any allocation can









where x(k) represents a possible assignment of flights to slots. In other words, the
allocation rule P (τ,Q) selects each assignment x(k) with probability pk. P (τ, Q)f,j
may be interpreted as the probability that f is assigned to slot j if af ≤ tj. A




To find the pk, we need to know the total number of feasible flights to slots
assignments, |Q|. In general, counting perfect matchings in bipartite graphs is an
NP-hard [67] problem. As we show below, since there is time dependency between
flights and slots, we can find the total number of flight-to-slot assignments in poly-
nomial time.
To find the fair share of each carrier from the available slots, the original
scheduled FCA arrival time of flights is considered, af . The flights whose original
scheduled time is earlier than the latest available time slot, af ≤ tm, are considered
and other flights are discarded. Here, we present a time-dependent method to find
the share of each carrier from set of available slots. Our important equity principles
states that:
• Each flight can use at most one slot.
• All flights have equal share of each slot that they can use in any feasible
allocation.
• Each flight can be assigned to any slot later than its scheduled time of arrival.
3.4.1 Proportional Random Assignment
In a non-decomposable problem, there are many feasible flights-to-slots as-
signments. We use the allocation procedure called proportional random assignment,
PRA [69].
PRA:
Step 1 : Set F1 = {f ∈ F : af ≤ t1)} and i = 1
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Step 2 : Choose an f ∈ Fi with probability 1|Fi| and assign f to si
Step 3 : Set i = i + 1
Step 4 : Set Fi = {f ∈ F : af ≤ ti} − {f}
Step 5 : If i ≤ m Then go to Step 2.
End.
PRA uses three principles of equity and randomly assigns flights to slots. Note that
PRA output is one assignment of flights-to-slots. However, we use PRA, viewed as
a random process with associated probabilities, as a basis for computing flights fair
share, FSf , which is the goal of this section.
The probability P (τ, Q)f,j can be interpreted as the (random) share of flight





Therefore, we need to compute pk in order to find the probability of assigning flight
f to slot j. We can see in the next proposition that pk can be found in a polynomial
time.




i=1(ni − (i− 1))





i=k(ni − (i− 1))
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Proof Consider the following bipartite graph. There is an edge eij between any
Figure 3.1: Bipartite graph
flight fi and slot sj if afi ≤ t(sj). nj is the degree of node sj which is equal to the
number of edges connected to it.
Consider one particular assignment that assigns flights Fi = {fi1 , fi2 , . . . , fim}
to {s1, . . . , sm} (i.e. fi1 → s1, fi2 → s2, . . . , fim → sm).
Prob(Assigning Fi to S) = P (fi1 → s1)×
m∏
j=2
Prob(fij → sj|{fi1 , . . . , fij} → {s1, . . . , sm})




. Remove fi1 and s1 and all of its connected edge from the graph. So, the
degree of all nodes s2, ..., sm is decreased by one. Now, there are n2 − 1 flights that
can be assigned to slot s2. Therefore, Prob(fi2 → s2) = 1n2−1 . Again remove fi2 and
its connected edges and s2 from the graph. The degree of remaining slots reduced by
1. i.e the degree of sj is nj−2. Continue this procedure till we get to the last slot, sm,
where we just have n− (m− 1) flights available. So, Prob(fim → sm) = 1nm−(m−1) .
Therefore the probability of choosing any perfect matching is:
pk =
1∏m
i=1(ni − (i− 1))
(3.1)
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The probability that f can be assigned to sj can be computed as:
P (τ, Q)f,j =
∑





We need to compute the number of flight-to-slot assignments such that f is assigned
to sj, in other words the size of Q(f, j). Suppose af ≥ t(sk), so there is an edge
between f and slots sk, ..., sm and k ≤ j ≤ m. Remove f and sj and all edges
connected to f from the graph. Therefore, the degree of all nodes after sk is reduced
by one. Start from s1, n1 flights can use the slot. Since one flight is already assigned
to s1, n2−1 flights can use the s2 and so on till sk−1 where nk−1−(k−2) can use sk−1.
Since the degree of nodes after sk is already reduced by one, so for k ≤ i ≤ (j − 1)
the number of flights that can use slot si is ni − 1− (i− 1). Just f can use sj. The
number of flights that can use sj+1 is nj+1 − 1 − (j − 1) (j − 1 flights is already
assigned to slots s1 to sj−1). Thus, for j + 1 ≤ i ≤ m the number of flights that can
use slot si is ni − 1− (i− 2). The size of set Q(f, j) is:
|Q(f, j)| = n1 × (n2 − 1)× ...× (nk−1 − (k − 2))× (nk − (k − 1)− 1)× ...
×(nj−1 − (j − 2)− 1)× 1× (nj+1 − (j − 1)− 1)× ...(nm − (m− 2)− 1) (3.3)
Substitute 3.3 and 3.1 in 3.2, we will have:
P (τ, Q)f,j =
∏j−1
i=k(ni − i)∏j
i=k(ni − (i− 1))
(3.4)
•
Corollary 3.4.1 PRA chooses each flight-to-slot assignment with equal probability,
and also the number of total flight-to-slot assignments is |Q| = ∏mi=1(ni − (i− 1)).
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Proof Proposition 3.4.1 the probability of one assignment can be computed. It is
seen that computing the probability, pk, is independent of k (i.e. it is independent of
any assignment). Therefore PRA chooses each flight-to-slot assignment with equal
probability. Therefore, PRA can choose any flight-to-slot assignment with equal
probability then the number of feasible flight-to-slot assignment is 1/p. •
The probability P (τ, Q)f,j can be interpreted as the (random) share of flight







We denote FairShareAlS as FSl for simplicity. We call this method Finding Fair
Share Based on PRA(FFS-PRA).
RBS considers only one possible flights-to-slots assignment, while in the new
method, all flights-to-slots assignments are considered. PRA chooses each of these
flights-to-slots assignment with equal probability. Therefore, it is possible for all
flights included in an AFP to have a positive share of available slots.
Corollary 3.4.2 In FFS-PRA, all flights have positive share from available slots.
Proof Since PRA considers all possible flights-to-slots assignments, therefore if a
flight,f , can use a slot, sj, it is considered in some of flights-to-slots assignments.
Since there is a probability associated to any feasible matching, and probability of
assigning f to sj is sum of probabilities of those flights-to-slots assignment in which
f is assigned to j. Then f has a positive share of j. •
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Flights f1A f1B f2A f2B f1C f2C
Airline A B A B C C
af 3:58 4:00 4:02 4:03 4:05 4:06
Table 3.1: Flight schedules of airline A, B and C
This is a very important point. Unlike RBS, that does not give any share to
later flights, FFS-PRA gives a positive share to any flight included in an AFP. Also,
it treats all flights with the same type equally. FFS-PRA chooses each flights-to-slots
assignment with equal probability. We should note that flights that are scheduled
earlier usually receive more share rather that later scheduled flights. Because the
number of feasible matchings for earlier flights is more that the number of feasible
matchings for the later flights. Therefore, FFS-PRA implicity gives higher share to
earlier scheduled flights.
3.4.2 Example
Suppose we have three carriers and six flights. Assume only four flights can
pass through the FCA. Table 3.1 shows the flights of three airlines, A, B and C,
and their scheduled arrival times at the boundary of FCA. The available time slots
are:
Slot: s1 s2 s3 s4
Time: 4:00 4:02 4:04 4:06
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Here we want to compare the result of FFS-PRA and RBS. Using RBS the
flight slot assignment is:
f1A → s1 f1B → s2 f2A → s3 f2B → s4
So the share of each airline form available slots is:
ShareAS = 2 Share
B
S = 2 Share
C
S = 0
Figure 3.2: The earliest slot that each flight can use
Figure 3.2 shows the earliest slot that each flight can use.
The latest time slot is 4:06, hence the flights with scheduled time afterward
are discarded. We are interested in finding the fair share of each carrier with respect
to the four available slots, {s1, ..., s4}.
We would like to compute the (random) share of each flight from any slots.
As we explained, Q is the set of feasible assignment of flights to slots. Figure 3.3
shows the graph of all possible combinations of slot assignments. Each level of the
graph corresponds to one of the available four slots, and the numbers on the edges
of the graph indicate the probability of assigning fi to sj for a given path.
For example, we would like to compute the share of flight f1A from s1, s2, s3
and s4. The share of flight f1A from s1 is equal to the probability of assigning f1A to
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Figure 3.3: All possible allocations of slots to flights
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s1 that equals to
1
2
. We can see from figure 3.2 n1 = 2, n2 = 3, n3 = 4 and n4 = 6.




















































































Table 3.3: Fair share of airlines from each slot
Table 3.2 shows the share of each flight for any slot; the share of a carrier for
a slot is equal to the summation of the share of its flights for that slot (Table 3.3).







). As we can see,
A, B and C have two flights, however, due to the scheduled time of these flights,
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their total share of slots are different. In addition, according to 3.5, the total share











Thus, while under RBS the share of airline C was zero, airline C has a 2
3
share
under FFS-PRA. small carriers, which have fewer flights or carriers with flights
scheduled late, still receive a share of available slots. We will see in the later chapters
that we use the fair share of carriers as an input to our random allocation procedures.
Therefore, carriers with positive share will have chance to receive slots.
In the next section, the equity properties of FFS-PRA will be discussed.
3.5 Equity of FFS-PRA
There are SEVERAL principles used to determine the fairness of an alloca-
tion. The fundamental principles of fairness are impartially and consistency, Equal
Treatment of Equals and Demand Monotonicity [74]. The formal definition of each
of these axioms is defined as:
Definition 3.5.1 A probabilistic allocation rule P is impartial if for any allocation
problem (τF , Q) and any permutation π of F ,
P (τF ◦ π,Q ◦ π) = P (τF , Q) ◦ π
Impartiality states that allocation rule should not discriminate among the flights
except insofar as they differ in type. In other words, if two flights are indifferent in
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type and in the feasible set, they will receive the same slot shares.
The origins of consistency principle is studied in [74], p.173 and [65]. Variations
of the consistency were formulated independently on different allocation problems,
such as the apportionment problem [14], the cost sharing and rationing problem [45],
and bargaining problems [64]. The definition of consistency by Vossen [69] is based
on the definition of consistency by Moulin[46], which recognizes the probabilistic
nature of the underlying allocation problem. Define for a given feasible set Q, any
f ∈ F , and any slot index j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m the reduced feasible set Q(f, j)
Q(f, j) = {x ∈ Q : xf,j = 1}
which represents the set of feasible allocation for the flights in F − {f} with slot j
unavailable. So, the consistency can be defined as:
Definition 3.5.2 A probabilistic allocation rule P is consistent if for any allocation
problem (τ, Q) and any f, f ′ ∈ F
P (τ,Q)f ′,j′ =
j′∑
j=1
P (τ,Q)f,jP (τF−{f}, Q(f, j))f ′,j′
In other words, the consistency property states that the expected slot shares should
be independent of the order in which flights are assigned to the slots.
The other important axiom of fairness is called Equal Treatment of Equals
(ETE). In the random allocation method, ETE can take in two interestingly different
forms[46]. Define Yi as an integer valued random variable that gives the total number
of slots assigned to carrier i.
Definition 3.5.3 The random allocation rule P has Equal Treatment of Equals Ex
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Post(ETEP) property, if for any realization y of the random variable Y, we have
FairShareAiS = FairShare
Aj
S ⇒ |Yi − Yj| ≤ 1
and It has Equal Treatment of Equals Ex Ante (ETEA)property if:
FairShareAiS = FairShare
Aj
S ⇒ Yi ∼ Yj
(these two random variables have identical distribution)
Another important axiom is Demand Monotonicity(DM) that can be defined
as:
Definition 3.5.4 A probabilistic allocation rule P has Demand Monotonicity prop-
erty if for any allocation problem (τ, Q):
FairShareAiS ≤ FairShareAiS |F ′i=Fi+f∗
DM says that an increase in carrier i’s demand Fi(extra flight f∗), leaving number
of available slots and other flight sets unchanged, can not deteriorate carrier i’s
(random) share.
Another strong property is that every carrier has a chance of receiving one
slot, this property is called Positive Share. In other words, FairShareAS > 0.
Theorem 3.5.1 FFS-PRA meets impartiality, Equal Treatment of Equals(Ex-Post),
consistency and Demand Monotonicity.
Proof We skip the easy proof of impartiality, equal treatment of equals and
consistency. Suppose airline Ai’s demand increased by one flight f
∗, where the
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earliest slot that f ∗ can use is sk. In other words, af∗ ≤ t(si) for all i ≥ k. Since
share of f ∗ from all slots which have af∗ ≤ t(si) is positive then there must be a
reduction in the share of all flights from slots which have af∗ ≤ t(si). Suppose δi is
the change in the share of flight fi. In other words, the new share of each flight is
going to be Share
′fi = Sharefi − δi. Thus, Sharef∗ =
∑
f∈F δi. We can write the




















As you can see
∑
f /∈FAi δi > 0 then the share of As is increased as its demand is
increased. •
3.6 Experimental Results
For our experiment, we used a test data set that had been employed by the
CDM Future Concepts Team to perform human in-the-loop experiments related
to SEVEN. It contained 386 flights with 38 flight operators. The data included
scheduled arrival arrival times at an FCA boundary. The FCA duration was from
18:00 pm to 21:00 pm.
We compared the results of ration-by-schedule(RBS), which is currently used
to allocate FCA access during airspace flow programs with the fair share that we
computed.
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Figure 3.4: Share of each airline form avialable slots for diffeent capacity reduction.
Comparing RBS with Fair Share
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In our experiment, we considered 40%, 50%, 60%, 70% and 80% en-route
capacity reduction for the FCA. Figure 3.4 shows the number of slots assigned to
each airline for a specific capacity reduction for the RBS.
The cells, which are highlighted, show when the difference between the FFS-
PRA allocation one and RBS exceed one
3.7 Discussion
So far, a method has been presented to determine the fair share of each carrier
from the available slots. Our fair Share assignment meets equity principles such
as impartiality, equal treatment of equals, consistency and demand monotonicity.
The current flight assignment procedure used during AFP’s uses ration-by-schedule
(RBS). RBS works based on first scheduled first served. Thus, under RBS flights,
which are scheduled late in the time horizon do not receive any share, while under
FFS-PRA all flights get a positive share.
As we will see in other chapters of this dissertation, we will use this fair share
as a parameter to assign flights to slots.
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Chapter 4
Allocation of Limited Resources in a Full Preference Domain
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter a method has been proposed to determine a fair share
of available slots for each carrier. Now, we would like to address how to assign slots
to carriers in a way that includes carriers’ preferences and maintains fairness. A
carrier’s FairShare, is interpreted as the number of slots the carrier should receive.
In section 4.2 we will review the literature of allocation of resources based
on agents’ preferences. Two algorithms will be proposed to assign slots to carriers
based on their preferences in section 4.3 . The equity of the proposed algorithms
will be discussed in section 4.4. Finally, we will provide some experimental results.
4.2 Background
The probabilistic allocation of indivisible objects has received significant re-
search attention. This problem can be considered in two main scenarios. The first
scenario, there are n objects and n agents and each agent receives exactly one ob-
ject. Each agent has a strict preference over the set of objects, objects are distinct.
In an application example agents can be workers and objects can be jobs in a com-
pany. In the second scenario there are k identical objects and n agents. Each agent
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receives a certain number of objects and each object is assigned to some agent. In
an application example, there are identical jobs that have to assigned to workers.
The problem of n agents and n objects has been studied by Abdulkadiroglu
and Sonmez [3], Bogomolnaia and Moulin [16], and Cres and Moulin [23]. Abdulka-
diroglu and Sonmez showed that the only Pareto-Efficient matching mechanisms is
a serial dictatorship, which are like random priority (RP), the priority ordering of
agents choose randomly, except that initial ordering of the agents is chosen in a
deterministic fashion. Svensson [56] showed that serial dictatorships are the only
rule satisfying strategyproofness, neutrality and nonbossiness. RP may not be effi-
cient if agents are endowed with utility functions consistent with their preferences.
The main contribution of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [16] is the definition of ordinal
efficiency. They showed that the probabilistic serial mechanism is weakly strategy
proof, and achieves an envy free, ordinarily efficient solution. In a result parallel
to Zhou’s impossibility theorem [77], the showed that no strategy proofness mech-
anism can achieve both ordinal efficiency and fairness, even in the weak sense of
equal treatment of equals. Katta and Sethuraman [38] addressed the problem in a
full preference domain. Cres and Moulin [23] show that in their model Probabilistic
Serial (PS) solution stochastically dominates the RP solution.
The second scenario has been addressed by Moulin [44] and Moulin and Stong
[46] where each agent demands a certain number of objects and total demand is
greater than the number of objects available. There is no preferences over the
objects in their model discussed. Ehlers and Klaus [29], Kureishi [39] studied the
case where each agents has a single peaked preference over the number of objects she
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may receive. A probabilistic rule chooses for each profile of preferences a probability
distribution over the set of allocations. An agent compares two distributions over
the set of allocations by evaluating the marginal distribution that are induced over
her allotments. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [17] studied the case when agents have
dichotomous preferences over the objects.
In our problem, we have set of slots, which can be considered as indivisible
heterogenous goods, and we have agents, carriers, that have different preferences
over the slots. We consider a full preference domain, where carriers can express
their preferences over the slots [66]. As we will discuss later, the preference domain
can be very rich and it is not as simple as ranking objects, slots.
4.3 Preference Based Proportional Random Allocation
As discussed, the problem of allocating of heterogeneous goods among agents
with different preferences has been studied in many papers. In our problem, we have
heterogeneous goods, slots, and agents, flight operators, with different preferences
over the slots.
The cost per minute of delay can vary substantially from flight to flight. For
example, the delay on a flight that has more passengers is more costly than a smaller
flight; delay on a flight with connecting passengers is more costly than a flight with
no connections. There are also significant cost implications of the status of the
flight’s crew. Thus, for each carrier the concept of preferences over slots is closely
related with the concept of preferences over the flights.
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Here we propose an algorithm that takes carriers’ preferences and flight sched-
ules as input, and allocates slots to carriers. Before explaining our algorithm we need
to explain two concepts, one is decomposition and the other is carriers’ preferences.
The algorithm needs a priority list of flights-to-slots assignments from carriers as
input.
4.3.1 Decomposition
As we explained in the previous chapter, when we compute the fair share for
each carrier, we need to insure that if Fj = {f : af ≤ tj} then |Fj| ≥ j for all j. We
provided a decomposition procedure based on deleting certain slots.
In the allocation problem that we will introduce here, we need a stronger form
of non-decomposability in order to prevent carriers from gaming the system. The
stronger version is called diverse non-decomposable.
In order to achieve a diverse non-decomposable set from original set of flights-
to-slots, we need to exclude two types of flights-to-slots subsets from the original
set. The first type of subset includes those flights-to-slots sets such that all flights
associated with the slots belong to the same carrier, i.e. there is no competition.
In this case, these slots are assigned to that particular carrier, thus this part of
the allocation problem is removed. The second type of subset is when |Fj| = j
which implies there are equal number of flights and slots. Allocation to each such
subset can be solved separately. After excluding these two types of subsets by
suitable decomposition, the remaining set of flights-to-slots satisfies the following
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Figure 4.1: (a) non-decomposable (b) diverse non-decomposable problem
two properties:
1- If Fj = {f : af ≤ tj} then |Fj| > j for all j < n
2- There is always more than one carrier that can use each slot.
We develop a procedure that excludes these two types of subsets from the
original set of flights-to-slots. Let us first clarify the concept of “non-decomposable”
and “diverse non-decomposable” using following example, and then we formally
define a procedure to achieve a diverse non-decomposable set from original set of
flights-to-slots.
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example to clarify concept of “non-decomposable” and
“diverse non-decomposable”. Figure 4.1 shows two configurations. The first config-
uration, (a), shows a set of flights-slots. It is seen than the set is non-decomposable,
but it is not diverse, because A is the only carrier that can use s1. The second
configuration, (b), is another set of flights-slots that is diverse non-decomposable.
The following procedure produces the appropriate decomposition.
Diverse Decomposition:
Step 0: Inputs: S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} and F = {f1, f2, ..., fm}, k = 1,j = 1, i = 1
Step 1: while j ≤ m, Do:
57
Step 1a: Fj = {f : af ≤ tj}
Step 1b: if |Fj| = j then Si = {sk, ..., sj}, Fi = Fj, F = F − Fj, S =
S − Si, k = j + 1, i = i + 1
else if |Fj| < j then delete sj
else if f ∈ Fj all belong to one carrier then S = S −{sj}, F = F −Fj
Step 1c: j = j + 1;
end while
The output of this procedure are flight-slot sets (Fi,Si). Each of these should be
analyzed separately. Further, the final line in step 1b deletes certain flight-slot pairs.
In each case, the slot assigned to the associated carrier.
In the next section, we will explain how the decomposition procedure elimi-
nates certain incentives for non-truthful preferences.
4.3.2 Priority List
We employ FairShare as a standard that determines how many slots a carrier
should receive in our slot allocation procedure. As part of our suggested slot alloca-
tion procedure, the FAA would inform each carrier of their fair share. We will prove
later that our proposed slot allocation algorithms guarantee a carrier a will receive
at least bFairShareac slots and at most dFairShareae slots. This means carriers
know about the minimum and the maximum total number of slots they will receive
before applying the slot allocation procedures. Carriers have precise knowledge of
the number of slots they will receive, but they do not know which slots they will be
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receive.
As discussed earlier our slot allocation procedures require airline flight-slot
preference information. There are two types of preference lists.
In first type, carriers submit to the FAA an ordered list of flight-to-slot assign-
ments. For example, carriers submit an ordered list of (fi, sj) pairs. This type of list
can be very long when the number of slots is large. The second type of list can be
a compact version of the first type. Instead of submitting an ordered list of (fi, sj)
pairs separately, carriers submit the pair of flights and bundle of slots. For example,
if a carrier ordered preference list is (fi, sj), (fi, sj+1), (fi, sj+2) (fl, sk) then it can
be expressed as (fi, sj : sj+2), (fl, sk).
Under certain conditions, a carrier may prefer a later slot to an earlier one.
A benefit of our slot allocation procedures is they provide flexibility for carriers to
express such preferences. In the following example, we try to better clarify concept
of priority list, and also to see how this priority list of flights could be used in some
non-trivial cases (e.g. when a carrier can prefer a later slot to an earlier slot).
Suppose, carrier A has three flights A101, A102 and A103. And also assume
there are six available slots, s1, . . . , s6. The earliest slots, af , that each flight can be
assigned could be:
Slot: s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Flights: A101 A102 A103
af s1 s4 s6
The following table illustrates a possible flight priority list that carrier A sub-
mits to FAA.
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Preference List for A
Rank (Flight,Slot) Rank (Flight,Slot)
1 (A103, s6) 6 (A101, s3)
2 (A101, s1) 7 (A101, s4)
3 (A101, s2) 8 (A101, s5)
4 (A102, s4) 9 (A101, s6)
5 (A102, s5) 10 (A102, s6)
For simplicity, the flight priority list can be shown as:
Rank (Flight,Slot) Rank (Flight,Slot)
1 (A103, s6) 4 (A101, s3 : s4)
2 (A101, s1 : s2) 5 (A101, s5 : s6)
3 (A102, s4 : s5) 6 (A102, s6)
In this example, for carrier A, the highest preference is s6, and it prefers later
slots s4 and s5 to earlier slot s3. This could happen if flight A103 had much higher
delay and cancellation costs than A101 and A102. Further, it could be the case that
A101 is delayed beyond slot s2, its marginal delay cost become small so that saving
delay in flight A102 become a higher priority.
It can be seen that by submitting a priority list of flights, carriers have the
flexibility to express a range preferences based on their internal cost functions.
4.3.3 Preference-Based Proportional Random Allocation
In this section, we introduce a randomized allocation procedure, which we
call Preference-Based Proportional Random Allocation (PBPRA). PBPRA, has the
following objections/properties:
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1− Slot allocation process that based on a randomized procedure.
2− Slot allocation process that includes carrier preferences.
3− Slot allocation process that assigns slots to carries in a way that each
carrier receives a total number of slots as “close” to its fair share.
We first outline the steps of the PBPRA algorithm. Initially the diverse de-
composition algorithm described in section 4.3.1 is applied to make sure any set of
flights-to-slots is non-decomposable. The two primary inputs to PBPRA are: A fair
share for each carrier and a flight priority list that is provided by each carrier.
The PBPRA execution involves two phases:
Phase 1: In this phase, the procedure starts by considering the fractional part
of each carrier’s fair share. In Phase 1, carriers are chosen randomly in proportion to
these fractional parts. When a carrier is chosen, it is assigned the highest flight-to-
slot assignment on its priority list. Each flight operator is assigned at most one slot
during this phase. Small flight operators with FairSharei < 1 are only considered
in this phase.
Phase 2: The second phase also uses a randomized procedure where the
remaining slots are considered from earliest to latest. Flight operators, who can use
the slot in question, are chosen randomly in proportion to the integer part of the
FairSharei’s.
Our algorithm can be defined formally:
PBPRA:
Inputs: Carriers: A1, A2, ..., AK ,
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Carrier Fair Shares: FS1, FS2, ..., FSK ,
Carrier Preference Lists: PList1, PList2, ..., PListK
Step 0: Calculate FSF1 , FS
F






2 , ..., FS
I
K , the fractional parts





Step 1: PHASE 1 while Nfract > 0 Do:
Step 1a: from among all carriers Ai with FS
F
i > 0 choose Ai∗ randomly
in proportion to the value of FSFi∗ .
Step 1b: Let (f ′, s′) be the highest priority assignment on PListi∗ . Assign
f ′ to s′ and set FSFi∗ = 0
Step 1c: Delete all assignments of the form (f ′, ∗) from PListi; delete all
assignments of the form (∗, s′) from all lists PListk for k 6= i,
Step 1d: Set Nfract = Nfract − 1;
end while
Step 2: PHASE 2
Step 2a: Let s′ be the earliest unassigned slot. If no flights can be as-
signed to s′, then delete s′ and skip to Step 2d. Otherwise, from among
all carriers Ai with FS
I
i > 0 that can use s
′, choose Ai∗ randomly in
proportion to the value of FSIi .
Step 2b: Let (f ′, s′) be the highest priority assignment on PListi∗ . As-
sign f ′ to s′.
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Step 2c: set FSIi∗ = FS
I
i∗ − 1; delete all assignments of the form (f ′, ∗)
from PListi; delete all assignments of the form (∗, s′) from all lists
PListk for k 6= i,
Step 2d: If all slots have been assigned then stop; otherwise repeat Step
2.
It can be seen that PBPRA algorithm has has an initial stage and two execution
phases. In the following, we are going to explain intuitively what PBPRA is trying
to accomplish at initial stage, phase one and phase two.
At the initial stage we perform the diverse decomposition procedure on the set
of flights-slots. This procedure reduces carrier gaming possibilities. Let us clarify
this gaming prevention in more detail with an example.
Suppose the true preference of A in Figure 4.1 is (f1A, s1) and (f2A, s2). Also
let FSa = 1.8 and FSB = 1.2. A may falsify its preferences, by indicating (f2A, s2) as
its highest preference. If we consider a non-decomposable problem (Figure 4.1(a)),
and if in the first phase A is chosen, then A receives s2 and in the second phase
it will receive s1. But in a diverse non-decomposable problem (Figure 4.1(b)), if A
lies, it receives s2 and it may loose its chance to receive s1. Thus, this is a penalty
for non-truthfulness. In example Figure 4.1(a), the initial decomposition step would
allocate s1 to A and then apply PBPRA to the remaining flights/slots. We will
prove later in this chapter, that PBPRA is resistent to gaming if we have a diverse
non-decomposable set of flights-slots.
PBPRA requires as input a fair share for each carrier. We proposed a fair
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share algorithm in the previous chapter 3, the output of the FFS-PRA can be used
as an input to PBPRA. There might be other methods to assign fair shares to
carriers. In this dissertation, we always use the output of FFS-PRA as input to our
procedures. The fair share can be used as a basis for allocating the slot to carriers.
As mentioned, one of the goals for PBPRA is to allocate a total number of slots to
carriers that is “close” to their fair shares. We will show in section 4.5, this goal
will be archived.
The third input to PBPRA consist of the carriers’ preferences lists. As ex-
plained in section 4.3.2 such flight priority lists provide flexibility for each carrier
to express its preferenceamong slots. PBPRA takes into account the preferences of
carriers when it allocates slots.
In the execution stage of PBPRA, there are two phases. The motivation
behind doing allocation in two phases is that we implicity give priority to the small
carriers ( i.e. carriers with FairShare < 1). Also, carriers more explicitly influence
the slots they receive.
In phase 1, we assign Nfract slots. In phase 2, every carrier a with FairSharea ≥
1 receives bFairShareac slot(s). Slots are assigned sequentially to carriers from
earlier to later ones. Indeed, we assign slots to carriers and then based on their
submitted priority list we assign the slot to the highest preferred flight according to
the carriers’ priority list.
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4.3.4 Modified- PBPRA
We now propose an alternative to PBPRA that is less complex, and also is
more immune to gaming. The modified PBPRA operates in just one phase, and we
call it M-PBPRA. The M-PBPRA is presented as follows. It can bee seen that step
1 of PBPRA is deleted and the step 2a is modified as below:
Step 2a: Let s′ be the earliest unassigned slot. If no flights can be assigned to s′,
then delete s′ and skip to Step 2d. Otherwise, from among all carriers that
can use s′, among all Ai with FSi ≥ 1 choose Ai∗ randomly in proportion to
the value of FSi else choose Ai∗ randomly in proportion to the value of FSi
among all carriers Ai with FSi > 0.
M-PBPRA successively assigns slots considering all carriers who can use that slot.
M-PBPRA starts from the earliest slot and assigns slots one by one to each carrier.
If a slot is assigned to a carrier, then its fair share is reduced by one. In each round,
only carriers with a positive share remaining will be considered.
We will prove in section 4.4 , that in order to be immune to gaming, having a
non-decomposable set is enough, while PBPRA needs a diverse non-decomposable
set. It should be noted that in the decomposition procedure described in section
3.4 we only delete slots while in the diverse decomposition procedure we delete slots
as well as assign and delete pairs of flight-to-slot assignemnt. This means PBPRA
requires a stronger constraint (i.e. diverse non-decomposable) to be resistent to
gaming. Let us clarify this in the following example.
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Flights f1A f1B f2A f2B f3A f3B f4A f1C f4B f2C f5A f3C
Airline A B A B A B A C B C A C
af 3:58 4:00 4:01 4:02 4:03 4:03 4:05 4:06 4:07 4:08 4:09 4:09
Table 4.1: Flight schedules of airline A, B and C
As explained before, in Figure 4.1, suppose the true preference of A is (f1A, s1)
and (f2A, s2). And also FSa = 1.8 and FSB = 1.2. A may falsify its preferences.
This means A may declare (f2A, s2) its highest preference. In Figure 4.1, in both
configurations, (a) and (b), since slots are assigned successively A can not improve
its allocation through deception.
It can also be seen that M-PBPRA is performed in a single phase (i.e. easier
for practical implementation), while PBPRA requires two phases. However, one
limitation with M-PBPRA is that when a carrier is chosen its preference list only
influences its flight-to-slot assignment, not the slot it receives. In PBPRA, carriers
have the opportunity to choose the best proffered slot. We illustrate in the following
example that PBPRA can assign the best proffered slot to carriers.
Table 4.1 shows the flight schedules of three carriers A, B and C. The available
time slots are:
Slot: s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Time: 4:00 4:02 4:04 4:06 4:08 4:10
Table 4.2 shows the flight priority of each airline.
As we explained in chapter 3, the fair share of each airline can be computed:
FSA = 2.71, FSB = 2.43 and FSC = 0.86. Therefore Nfrac = 2.
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A B C
(f2A, s2 : s3) (f4B, s5 : s6) (f1C , s4 : s5)
(f3A, s3 : s4) (f2B, s2 : s4) (f2C , s5 : s6)
(f4A, s4 : s6) (f1B, s1 : s3) (f3C , s6)
(f1A, s1 : s6) (f3B, s3 : s6)
(f5A, s6)
Table 4.2: Preference list for airlines A, B and C
While executing PBPRA, if in the first phase A and B are chosen, then A and
B receive their first preferences, i.e. A receives (f2A, s2) and B receives (f4B, s5).
Instead if we run M-PBPRA and A and B are chosen, then A receives (f1A, s1)
and B receives (f2B, s2) which are not their first preferences. This shows that in
PBPRA, A and B have the opportunity to choose their best proffered slots while in
M-PBPRA they have not received their first preferences .
The M-PBPRA procedure is very similar to PRA except that the demand
(fair share of carriers) is not an integer value (In PRA, demand of each agent is an
integer value). At each round of the procedure, we implicity give priority to the
carriers with remaining fair share greater than 1. This helps to make sure every
carrier receives at least bFairSharec. If in one round of the procedure, say the jth,
there is no carrier with FS ≥ 1, then M-PBPRA considers all carriers that can use
slot sj with a positive remaining fair share.
In most of cases, PBPRA or M-PBPRA assigns all slots, however there are
very rare instances that some slots could remain unassigned. For example, Figure
4.2 shows a non-decomposable problem, in which 6 airlines A, B, C, D, E and G
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Figure 4.2: Example of unused slots in PBPRA or M-PBPRA
compete for 6 slots. Suppose the highest preference for airlines A, B, C, D, E and
G are (f2A, s6), (f1B, s1), (f1C , s2), (f1D, s3), (f1E, s4) and (f2G, s5) respectively. As
explained in chapter 3, the fair share of each airlines can be computed: FSA = 0.99,
FSB = 0.9, FSC = 0.81, FSD = 0.63, FSE = 0.53 and FSG = 2.14. Therefore
Nfrac = 4. While executing PBPRA, if in the first phase, A, D, E and G are chosen,
then s6, s3, s4 and s5 are assigned to A, D, E and G respectively. In the second
phase PBPRA starts from first unassigned airline which is s1. The only two airlines
that can use s1 are A and B. Since A and B’s remaining fair share is zero then no
airlines can use s1. Therefore, s1 remains unused.
We provide the following example to explain how these two procedures work.
4.3.5 Example
Consider example 3.4.2; there are three carriers each having two flights; each












(f2A, s2) (f2B, s3) (f1C , s4)
(f2A, s3) (f2B, s4) (f2C , s4)
(f1A, s1) (f1B, s1)
(f1A, s2) (f1B, s2)
(f2A, s4)
Table 4.3: Preference list for airlines A, B and C
Therefore the integer part and fraction part of each fair share is:
FSIA = 1 FS
I












Thus Nfract = 2. Suppose carriers submit their priority list of flights based on Table











where Probi is the probability that carrier i is chosen. Suppose, B is chosen, so B
will receive its highest priority flight in its priority list, so B will receive s3, f2B → s3.
Now, any (∗, s3) is removed form preference tables. We reduce the Nfrac = 1 and
FSFB = 0. Next, we randomly choose A and C with probabilities proportion to their







Suppose C is selected, so f1C will be assigned to s4. Update the preference table
and remove any pair of (∗, s4). Phase one of algorithm is done and we start with
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will be assigned to one of those, suppose s1 assigned to A, based on A’s priority list,
f1A goes to s1. As you can see, f1A is not its highest priority flight, but it is the
only flight that can use s1 therefore it must take s1. Finally, B will receive s2 and
f1B assigned to s2.
M-PBPRA starts from s1, A and B are the two carriers that can use s1, both












and assign f1A to s1. We continue to the next slot, s2; both A and B can
use s2 while B is the only airline with FSB ≥ 1. Thus, we assign s2 to the highest
priority flight in PListB, so f1B goes to s2. Also, we reduce the B’s fair share by
one, FSB = FSB − 1 = 1912 − 1 = 712 . In the next round, A and B compete for s3;
since both airlines can use s3 and both have positive share (no one has fair share







Suppose B is chosen, since its fair share is less than one, the fair share of B will
be set to zero and from PListB, f2B is assigned to s3. Finally, in the last round of







Suppose C is chosen then we assign f1C to s4.
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If we compare the result with RBS, we notice that under RBS, the flight-to-slot
assignment will ba:
f1A → s1 f1B → s2 f2A → s3 f2B → s4
Note that C receives nothing. In both PBPRA and M-PBPRA, C has a chance
to receive a slot. Of course, the second important point of allocation is that under
PBPRA and M-PBPRA the assignment is based on carriers’ preferences.
4.4 Equity of PBPRA and M-PBPRA
We assume that our problem is strictly non-decomposable. Let us define Q
as set of all possible assignments of carriers to slots. It is convenient to think of a
deterministic assignment as a 0-1 matrix, with rows indexed by carriers and columns
indexed by slots. Each slot is assigned only to one carrier, i.e. there is exactly a
single 1 in each column and the number of slots assigned to a carrier a does not




xi,j ∈ {0, 1}K×m :
∑
i
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀j, bFairShareic ≤
∑
j
xi,j ≤ dFairShareie ∀i
}
(4.1)
where ith row of each assignment matrix shows the slots assigned to carrier i and K
is the number of carriers.
We call a problem “strictly non-decomposable” if for all deterministic assign-
ment in Q,
∑
i xij = 1 ∀i. It means that all slot has been assigned.
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Corollary 4.4.1 In a strictly non-decomposable set, PBPRA and M-PBPRA assign
to any carrier a, at least bFairShareac and at most dFairShareae slots.
Proof Since our problem is strictly non-decomposable which means all slots are as-
signed, all carriers are assigned bFairShareac slots in the second phase of PBPRA.
In the first phase, carriers with positive fractional part can participate once. There-
fore, in the first phase no carrier can receive more than one slot. Thus, any carrier
receives at most dFairShareae.
In M-PBPRA, at each step of the procedure, carriers with fair share greater or
equal one are considered first. Since our problem is strictly non-decomposable and
sum of all fair shares is equal to the number of available slots, each carrier, a, re-
ceives bFairShareac. During the those steps when carriers with remaining positive
fair share are considered, if a carrier receives a slot then its fair share is reduced to
zero. Thus, the total number of slots a carrier receives is at most bFairShareac+ 1
or dFairShareae. •
We call the problem “strictly diverse non-decomposable” if all slots have been
assigned and there is more than one carrier that can be assigned to any slot. In real-
ity, the number of fights and airlines are large enough so that the set of flights-slots
can always be considered strictly diverse non-decomposable. For example, based
on some experimental results that we will analyze in following section, involving a
set of 386 flights and 40 airlines, the problem always had the strictly diverse non-
decomposable property after 40% or more capacity reduction. To make sure that
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we have a strictly non-decomposable set of flights-to-slots at each step of PBPRA,
we may execute the diverse decomposition procedure after every round of slot allo-
cation. This means the following step should be added before Step 2a of PBPRA:
Step 2a: Run diverse decomposition procedure
A random feasible assignment, P , can be represented as a probability distri-
bution over all deterministic feasible assignments (Πi); the corresponding convex
combination of deterministic matrices is a matrix whose (i, j)th entry represents the
probability with which carrier i receives slot j can be represented as pij. Let P be
set of all random feasible assignments.
The set of all preference orderings is called a preference domain and denoted
by A. A random assignment mechanism is a mapping from AK to P . As we said,
our objective is to show some desirable fairness properties for PBPRA and also M-
PBPRA. To describe the fairness properties formally we need to extend the carriers’
preferences over the slots to preferences over the random assignment.
Given two random assignments P and Q, we say carrier i prefers P to Q (
P Âi Q ) if the allocation Pi stochastically dominates the allocation Qi ( where Pi
is the ith row, which represents the allocation for carrier i in the random assignment
P ). Thus, formally we can define:
Definition 4.4.1 Given two random assignments P and Q, P stochastically dom-
inates Q with respect to carrier’s i preference ordering if :






qik, ∀j ∈ S (4.2)
Moreover, a random assignment P dominates random assignment Q if all carriers
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prefer P to Q, that is P Âi Q for all i ∈ A. If one carrier prefers P to Q and
another prefers Q to P then P  Q and also Q  P . Now we are ready to define
the efficiency and fairness properties.
There are three important properties : efficiency, fairness that includes Equal
treatment of equals and anonymity, and strategy proofness. We describe each of
these properties extensively as follows:
Efficiency - To understand the concept of efficiency we need to describe the
concept of Pareto Optimality. The formal definition of Pareto Optimality is:
Definition 4.4.2 A deterministic assignment Πi is Pareto optimal if there is no
other deterministic allocation, Π′, such that ∀ Ai Π′i % Πi and at least for one Aj,
Π′j Â Πj.
The Pareto optimality states that if one carrier can not do better unless another
carrier is worse off. It should be noted for Pareto-Optimality property that we
evaluate our procedures against it, slots are considered in an abstract form. This
means total number of slots that a carrier receives does matter , and also earlier
slots are better than later ones. This means utility of a carrier is not associated
with a slot. This implies a weak notion of Pareto optimality. The stronger form of
Pareto optimality is to look at the deterministic assignments that are aligned with
carriers’ preferences which does not hold for our procedures.
Proposition 4.4.1 In a strictly non-decomposable set, all Π in Q are Pareto Op-
timal.
Proof Case 1- Suppose in allocation Π carrier a receives its bFairShareac. Car-
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rier a strictly prefers allocation Π′ to Π if it receives its dFairShareae. In order for
carrier a to receive one more slot, then there must be another carrier, b, that looses
one slot. Since the total number of slots is constant, m. Thus, carrier b does not
prefers Π′ to Π. In other words, Π′b  Πb. Case 2- Suppose in allocation Π carrier
a receives its dFairShareae. Since this is the most slots that carrier a can receive,
so it can not do better. Case 3- when the number of slots assigned to two carriers
a and b do not change and they just exchange an slot. Suppose in assignment Π,
sj and si are assigned to a and b respectively, and si is earlier than sj. Suppose a
receives si and b receives sj in assignment Π
′. a prefers Π′ Â Πj since it receives an
earlier slot while b does not prefers Π′ to Π, Π′b  Πb. •
We should have note that we look at the efficiency in an abstract way and we
don’t include the utility of the carriers. The random allocation is called efficient if:
Definition 4.4.3 P is :
(a) Ex post efficient iff it can be represented as a probability distribution over
Pareto optimal deterministic assignments.
(b) Ex ante efficient iff for any profile of utility functions consistent with the pref-
erence profile of the agents, the resulting expected utility vector is Pareto effi-
cient1.
(c) Ordinally efficient iff it is not dominated by any other assignment Q.
1For any random assignment in which the expected utility of some agent is strictly greater,
there must be another agent that whose expected utility is strictly lower.
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It can be shown that ex post efficiency implies ordinally efficiency, which implies ex
post efficiency. The relation between various notation of efficiency is explored in [2]
and [42].
Fairness As we said in the previous chapter, two important axioms of
fairness is called anonymity and Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE). You can refer
to the previous chapter for the formal definition of these two properties. A ran-
dom assignment mechanism is anonymous if the its out come is only depends on
the preference profile and it is independent of the type of agents. Equal treatment
of equals ex post states that carriers with the same schedule and same preference
profile should have the same probability distribution over slots. On the other hand
the stronger version of Equal treatment of equals is ETE-ex post: the outcome of
allocation, the actual total number of slots received by a carrier, to two carriers with
the same schedule flights should be different in at most one slot.
Incentive A random assignment mechanism is said to be strategy-proof if
for each agent the true preference ordering is a dominant strategy. If Bi is the true
valuation of slots for carrier i, then for any Bi compatible with true Âi , the expected
return for agent i is higher than any other Â∗i (false preference ordering). A weaker
notation of strategy-proofness can be defined: a mechanism is weakly strategy proof
if an agent by falsifying her preference list can not obtain an allocation that she
strictly prefers to her true allocation.
Definition 4.4.4 Given a mechanism P (.), we define:
strategy proofness: Pi(Â)sd(Âi)Pi(Â |i Â∗i ) ∀i ∈ N,Â∗∈ (P ),Â∈ PN
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Weak Strategy-proofness: Pi(Â |i Â∗i )sd(Âi)Pi(Â) ⇒ Pi(Â |i Â∗i ) = Pi(Â)
With all this explanation we can have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4.1 (a) In a strictly non-decomposable problem, PBPRA and M-PBPRA
meet anonymity, Equal treatment of equals (ex-post), ex post efficiency and M-
PBPRA meets strategy proofness.
(b) In a strictly diverse non-decomposable problem PBPRA meets strategy proofness.
Proof It is easy to see that both procedures are anonymous.
Our problem is strictly non-decomposable which means all slots are assigned. In
PBPRA, we make sure that each carrier a receives its bFairShareac. The only
difference would be in the fractional part; thus the difference between two carriers
with same share will be at most one. In M-PBPRA, since in each round we give
priority to the carriers with a fair share greater than one, then eac carrier a will
receive at least bFairShareac. The rest of slots would be distributed based on a
randomization among carriers with positive share; no carriers can receive more than
one slot in this phase. Therefore, there will be at most one slot difference between
carriers with the same fair share.
We can write P as a probability distribution over all Pareto Optimal deter-
ministic assignments in Q so it is ex-post efficient.
To prove strategy proofness, we consider two procedures PBPRA and M–
PBPRA separately. M-PBPRA acts like as random priority method (or a serial dic-
tator). There is a known probability associated with each deterministic assignment.
Computing the probabilities are independent from carriers’ preferences. Thus, not
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telling the truth does not help a carrier to increase its chance of winning a better slot.
In other words, carriers can not have an assignment that stochastically dominates
another assignment by falsifying their preferences. Thus, there is no advantage for
a carrier to express an untrue preference.
In PBPRA, suppose airline a does not say the truth about its preferences
while other airlines are truthful. If FSa < 1, then a can only be considered in the
first phase, and if it is chosen it may receive an available slot it is proffered to the
one it receives. Therefore, it can not do better. If FSFa = 0, then carrier a is only
considered in the second phase. Since the first phase has already been run, then
there is a known probability associated with each deterministic assignment. Also,
the set of flights-slots is strictly diverse non-decomposable, which means that there
is always more than one carrier compete for a slot. Therefore, a can not increase
its chance of wining a proffered slot by falsifying its preferences. The last scenario
is when FSFa > 1, i.e. a participates in both phases. Without loss of generality,
suppose a prefers si to sj, si Âa sj, but it falsifies its preferences by sj Â∗a si. If in
the first phase a is chosen and the best available slot is si but it chooses sj instead
of si. Our problem is strictly diverse non-decomposable, which means si can be
claimed by another carrier. Then by falsifying its preference, a increases the chance




In our experiments, we use a test data set that had been employed by the
CDM Future Concepts Team to perform human-in-the-loop experiments related
to SEVEN. It contained 386 flights with 38 flight operators. The data included
scheduled arrival arrival times at an FCA boundary. The FCA duration was from
18:00 pm to 21:00 pm. We generated a flight cost function that is described below.
Given the cost function, we generated the priority list for each flight operator based
on the following principle:
Of all available flights that could use a slot, the flight operator preferred
allocating the slot to the flight with the highest marginal cost of delay.
We consider the cost of each flight as a function of the number of passengers
(actually number of aircraft seats) and the flight delay. The cost function (based
on generic advice from airline dispatchers) was constructed based on the following
general principles. First, the initial 15 minutes of delay is considered free. The Air
Transportation Association (ATA) estimates that direct operating cost during block
time is $64 per minute. We assume ground cost is 1/2 as expensive as air cost (and
this is an accepted practice in the literature), so $64/2 = $32. We can assume that
there is also the possibility of rerouting the flight. This effectively caps the delay
cost (once the delay cost curve exceeds the rerouting cost, the airline is better off
rerouting the flight). As with the airline cost, we have assumed that passengers are
willing to ignore the first 15 minutes of delay, that their time is worth $0.60 for each
minute thereafter, and that this linear function is capped after 15 hours [21]. The
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$0.60 figure again comes from the ATA web site, which cites $34.88 per hour as an
average cost of passenger time. This translates to $34.88/60 = $0.5813 per minute,
per passenger, which we rounded to $0.60 per minute. Our cost function should
represent internal airline costs. Airlines are interested in providing good customer
service but do not suffer the full brunt of passenger costs. We approximated this
customer service perspective by multiplying the passenger cost function by 1/6 and
adding the resultant cost to the flight delay costs as described above. Thus, we can
write the flight delay cost function as:




0 x ≤ 15
(32 + 0.1P )(x− 15) 15 < x ≤ Mp
(32 + 0.1P )(Mp − 15) x > Mp
Where Mp is a flight specific max delay. That is, it is assumed that after Mp
minutes of delay, the flight operator would prefer to reroute the flight. Since the cost
effectiveness of rerouting will vary with flight characteristics we chose Mp randomly
with uniform likelihood between 30 to 90 minutes.
We compared the results of PBPRA and M-PBPRA against ration-by-schedule
(RBS), which is currently used to allocate FCA access during airspace flow programs.
Our version of RBS proceeded from the earliest to latest slot. At each step, it
assigned the available flight with the earliest scheduled arrival time (ties were broken
randomly with equal likelihood). Once we determined a flight-to-airline assignment,
if multiple flights from the chosen airline could be assigned to the same slot, then
we assigned the flight with the highest marginal cost of delay. In this way, at the
end of the procedure, the airlines could not improve their cost function by doing an
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“internal” flight-to-slot reassignment.
In our experiments, we considered 40%, 50%, 60%, 70% and 80% en-route
capacity reduction for the FCA. We performed 2000 repetitions of the procedure
(note that since PBPRA and M-PBPRA use randomization their “expected” im-
pacted can only be calculated by doing multiple repetitions). Table 4.4 shows the
average number of slots assigned to each airline for a specific capacity reduction.
A noteworthy point to be made is that many airlines received 0 slots under
RBS. Note that since RBS is a deterministic procedure if an airline receives 0 under
one recitation it receives 0 under all repetitions. Such airlines had only a single
flight demanding access to the FCA and that flight had a relatively late scheduled
arrival time. On the other hand, the fractional values achieved by PBPRA indicate
that on some repetitions PBPRA allocated such an airline a slot and on others it
did not. Few would probably dispute that this is a more equitable outcome.
An important related issue is the degree to which PBPRA or M-PBPRA
achieve (on the average) the flight operator fair shares (FSi’s). As stated earlier
we cannot formally prove that this is the case. As the results in the table indicates
experimentally both algorithms come very close achieving FSi values. As would be
expected, the RBS can diverge by fairly significant amounts. Table 4.5 shows the
mean square error of PBPRA, M-PBPRA and RBS compare to the fair share for
each capacity reduction.
Of course, a very fundamental implicit goal of our procedure is that flight op-
erators should be able to improve their internal performance based on an allocation
process that takes into account their preferences. The total cost saving over all
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Table 4.4: Comparison of PBPRA, M-PBPRA and RBS allocations
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% Capacity reduction PBPRA M-PBPRA RBS
40 0.211 0.214 31.23
50 0.213 0.221 74.49
60 0.172 0.166 35.61
70 0.17 0.154 35.35
80 0.284 0.275 57.63
Table 4.5: Total mean square error from fair share, PBPRA and M-PBPRA vs.
RBS
airlines of PBPRA compared to RBS is shown in Fig 4.3. We note that PBPRA
consistently provides a significant savings. Table 4.5 provides the corresponding
percentage savings.
There is a reduction in total delay of both algorithms vs. RBS, we can see the
result in table 4.5. Note that PBPRA does a little bit better in terms of average
cost saving and average total delay. However, the advantage of M-PBPRA is it has
a smaller standard deviation than PBPRA. As can be seen in Figure 4.3 the average
cost plus standard deviation of M-PBPRA falls below both PBPRA and RBS.
4.6 Discussion
In this chapter two randomized procedures have been proposed to assign flights
to slots based on carriers’ preferences. In RBS, flights-to-slots assignment is based
on the flight schedule and later flights may not receive slots. We proposed random-
ized methods that use an exogenous fair share of carriers from available slots as a
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Figure 4.3: Total cost of all flight operators, RBS vs. PBPRA.






Table 4.6: Total percent of cost savings PBPRA and M-PBPRA compared to RBS
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Table 4.7: Total percent of average delay reduction, PBPRA and M-PBPRA com-
pared to RBS
parameter to assign flights to slots. Carriers are entitled to receive the number of
slots based on their fair share. It is guaranteed that any carrier receives at least
the floor of its fair share. These methods give carriers whose flights are scheduled
late chance of receiving a slot. We also explored the principles of our allocation
procedures. We showed that PBPRA and M-PBPRA meet equity principles and
also have ex-post efficiency and strategy proofness properties. Also, we tested our
algorithms on real data. Our algorithms showed improved performance compare to
the RBS. In PBPRA and M-PBPRA, expected total number of slots that a carrier
receives is very close to its fair share.
In PBPRA (or M-PBPRA), although slot preferences were employed we im-
plicity assumed that all slots had equal values. In reality, some slots are worth more
tan others. It is desirable for us that carriers can express their preference between
delay and rerouting. As we mentioned, some carriers prefer to receive fewer slots
but to preserve on-time performance for certain important fights while other ones
85
prefer to receive more slots and can tolerate more delays. We will propose a new
algorithm in the next chapter to address this problem.
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Chapter 5
A New Randomized Allocation Using Dual Pricing of Resources
5.1 Introduction
In the case of capacity reduction in enroute resources we explained how to find
a fair share for each carrier based on scheduled arrival times at a FCA. Also, we
proposed probabilistic algorithms that assign slots to flights. In our algorithms we
took into account the preference of carriers for each flight. The algorithms allocate
slots successively to carriers while considering their fair shares. No carriers would
receive more than the ceiling of its fair share.We demonstrated that both algorithms,
meet fairness and efficiency properties.
In this chapter, we extend the allocation process to treat a new variant of the
problem. We describe the problem of allocation of slots in section 5.2. In section
5.3 a new algorithm will be proposed to allocate slots. The equity and incentive of
our algorithm will be discussed in section 5.4. Finally, we will explain the algorithm
by a numerical example.
5.2 Problem Description
In PBPRA (or M-PBPRA), although slot preferences were employed we im-
plicity assumed that all slots had equal values. Specifically, when measuring and
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allocation against a carrier’s fair share, we only considered the total number of slots
a carrier received. Clearly, given that a flight can use two slots, the earlier one is
always preferred. Further, those carriers that would like to maintain their on time
performance for key flights, may be willing to pay more than others for particular
slots. We wish to allow carriers to “pay more” for earlier slots when they wish to
do so.
Our objective here is somehow distinguish between those carriers who want
to maintain the on-time performance for certain flights and in return receive fewer
slots and those carriers who can tolerate more delay and would like to receive more
slots.
The methods we propose to accomplish these objectives employ a new prefer-
ence scheme. Our algorithm has two phases. We will explain each phase of algorithm
in the following section.
5.3 Dual Price Proportional Random Assignment
In general, each carrier will have different cost for delay and rerouting (or
cancellation). In PBPRA we include the carriers’ preferences to allocate slots based
on their exogenous fair share. We did not elicit preferences related to the trade off
between delay and rerouting .
Dual-Price Proportional Random Assignment (DP-PRA) is a new algorithm
that considers the carriers’ tradeoff between delay and rerouting (or cancellation).
The basic concept in the DP-PRA is : those airlines who want to receive fewer slots
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in order to get less delay should be able to do so in exchange for a reduction in the
total number of slots they receive. That is, if one views the fair share as currency
then they can pay more than one unit for highly desirable slots.
Consider the example of carrier A who prefers to receive priority for certain
flights in exchange for receiving fewer slots in total. The algorithm employs a pa-
rameter which is the “value” of the higher priority slots distributed. If carrier A’s
fair share is 5.5 then it can receive two “high-priority” slots based on 2 (b5.5
2
c). The
remainder of its fair share is 1.5, which can then be used to receive later slots. It is
very important to notice that only those carriers that can afford this trade off (have
a fair share ≥ 2) are considered. If a small carrier with a small fair share prefers to
receive good slots, if it does not have enough budget to give up a second flight, it
can not be considered.
5.3.1 Slot Values
For illustration purposes, suppose we have two sets of airlines. Let A1 be the
set of airlines that prefer less delay and A2 the set of airlines that prefer to receive
more slots. In our allocation algorithm we initially give priority to the airlines in
A1. Therefore, they must pay more for each slot they initially receive because of the
priority. Let us assume the price of each slot they receive is PH . Since airlines in A1
receive priority in the allocation process their exogenous fair share must be greater
than PH .
The FAA acts as an independent, fair moderator. The FAA announces the
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value of priority slots. This value must be greater than one. The process operates so
that the total value of slots given away equals the number of slots available. Since
the value of each slot for the airlines in set A1 is PH , we can compute the value of
remaining slots. Thus, later (less preferred) slots will have a value less than one.
Suppose there are m slots available, to compute the value of remaining slots, we





[FSa − (FSa mod∗ PH)])/PH (5.1)
Where FSa is the fair share of carrier a. And (FSa mod
∗ PH) is the reminder of
FSa from PH




As we can see the value of the remaining slots is less than one. Note that higher
PH values result in a smaller m1. We will show the effect of varying PH in our
simulation results.
5.3.2 Flight Priority
Carries must submit a list of flight priorities. As we explained in the pre-
vious chapter, the priority list includes tuple of (f, s). To make the list somehow
shorter, carriers can submit the list of flights and a range of slots. For example,
(f, {si, si+1, ..., sk}).
1Note: we use mod for integer values. For example 7 mod 3 = 1. Here, we use mod∗ for positive
real values. Then, ∀a, b ∈ R+a mod∗ b = a− bbab c. For example 2.5 mod∗ 0.2 = 2.5− 0.2b 2.50.2c =
0.1and9 mod∗ 2.5 = 9− 2.5b 92.5c = 1.
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5.3.3 DP-PRA
DP-PRA contains two phases: First phase allocates slots to the flights in the
set A1 and in the second phase all remaining slots are allocated from the earliest
available to the latest available. The second phase can use one one the procedures
in cahpter4, i.e. PBPRA or M-PBPRA.
As mentioned, we need to have a diverse non-decomposable set of flights-slots.
Therefore, we run strong decomposition algorithm before applying DP-PRA. We
define two policies. Policy P1, where carriers prefer to receive priority that means
these carriers prefer to receive fewer slots but less delay. Policy P2, where carriers
are not interested to receive priority instead they prefer to receive more slots. We
develop the DP-PRA procedure in the formal way as below:
Step 2: PHASE 0
Step 0a: Inputs: Set of flights F , set of carriers A, set of available slots
S, Carriers’ preference lists: PList1, PList2, ..., PListK also PH and
carriers set A1 = {a ∈ A : P1 Âa P2, FSa ≥ PH}.
Step 0b: Calculate the fair share of each airline FSa based on PRA
Step 0c: Calculate PL based on 5.1 and 5.2
Step 1: PHASE 1 while A1 6= ∅ Do:
Step 1a: ∀a ∈ A1, Randomly choose an a∗ ∈ A1 in proportion to FSa∗ .
Step 1b: From PLista∗ , assign the best slot available to the highest pri-
ority flight (f∗, s∗)
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Step 1c: FSa∗ = FSa∗−PH , PLista∗ = PLista∗−{f ∗} and S = S−{s∗}
and A1 = {a ∈ A1 : FSa ≥ PH}.
end while
Step 2: PHASE 2
Step 2a: A = {a ∈ A : FSa > 0}.
Step 2b: for all a in A, FSa = FSa/PL.
Step 2c: Run PBPRA.
The modified version of DP-PRA is MDP-PRA and in step 2-c we can run
M-PBPRA instead of PBPRA.
In the first phase of algorithm we consider just carriers in A1 who can afford
a slot with value of PH . A carrier will be chosen randomly based on its fair share,
FSa∗ . Then from PLista∗ we assign the best slot available to the highest priority
flight, f ∗. Assign f ∗ to s∗ then remove f ∗ from PLista∗ and s∗ from S. We reduce
the fair share of a∗ by PH . We repeat this phase until A1 becomes empty. Now, we
move to the second phase.
In the second phase of the algorithm all airlines with positive fair share will
be considered. The value of each slot in the second phase is PL. We make the value
of each slot one and increase the fair share of all airlines by 1/PL. Then, we execute
PBPRA or M-PBPRA. A carrier will be chosen randomly in proportion to its fair
share. From PLista the highest priority flight from carrier a will be chosen. Carrier
a’s fair share will be reduced by one.
92
Flights f1A f1B f2A f2B f3A f3B f4A f1C f4B f2C f5A f3C
Airline A B A B A B A C B C A C
af 3:58 4:00 4:01 4:02 4:03 4:03 4:05 4:06 4:07 4:08 4:09 4:09
Table 5.1: Flight schedules of airline A, B and C
A B C
(f2A, s2 : s3) (f1B, s1 : s3) (f1C , s4 : s5)
(f3A, s3 : s4) (f2B, s2 : s4) (f2C , s5 : s6)
(f4A, s4 : s6) (f4B, s5 : s6) (f3C , s6)
(f1A, s1 : s6) (f3B, s3 : s6)
(f5A, s6)
Table 5.2: Preference list for airlines A, B and C
5.3.4 Example
Suppose we have 12 flights belonging to three airlines A, B and C. There
are 6 slots available which means there is 50% capacity reduction. Table 5.1 shows
the flights of three airlines and their scheduled arrival times at the boundary of the
FCA. The available time slots are:
Slot: s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Time: 4:00 4:02 4:04 4:06 4:08 4:10
Table 5.2 shows the flight priority of each airline. As we explained in chapter
3, the fair share of each airlines can be computed : FSA = 2.71, FSB = 2.43 and
FSC = 0.86.
Among these three airlines A and B choose policy P1 while C selects policy
P2. This means A and B prefer to receive priority in order to receive fewer slots but
less delay. In other words, C is not interested to receive priority instead it prefers
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to receive more slots. Assume the price of each slot in the first round is 2. Both
airlines have fair shares greater than two, then A1 = {A,B}. , so A and B each can
afford one slot. There are four slots available which will be allocated in the second
round. We can compute the value of remaining slots arePL =
6−4
6−2 = 0.5
In first phase of the algorithm, A and B participate. In the first round we








Suppose A is chosen, so FSA = 2.71− 2 = 0.71. From PListA the highest priority
flight, f2A, receives slot s2. We update the table and remove any (∗, s2). Now, B is
the only airline that can afford a slot. Thus, we will assign s1 to f1B. The fair share
of B is reduced by 2, FSA = 2.43− 2 = 0.43. We remove s1 from any tuple (∗, s1)
in the preference table. Now we move to the second phase. We can run PBPRA




= 1.42 FSB =
0.43
0.5




If we run PBPRA: As explained, we only take into account the fractional part,
Nfrac = 2. Suppose B and C are chosen. We assign available slots to the highest
priority flights of B and C. Thus, f2B is assigned to s3 and f1C goes to s4. The fair
share of both airlines reduced. In the second part, the integer part of the fair shares
are considered. Therefore, A and C are considered. We first assign s5 and then s6.
Suppose A is chosen first and then C is chosen. Thus, f4A and f2C receive s5 and
s6 respectively.
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Slots s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
RBS f1A f1B f2A f2B f3A f3B
PBPRA f1A f2A f1B f1C f4B f5A
M-PBPRA f1A f1B f3A f2B f1C f1A
DP-PRA f1B f2A f2B f1C f4A f2C
MDP-PRA f1B f2A f3A f1C f4B f2C
Table 5.3: Flights-Slots assignments based on execution of different procedures
If instead of PBPRA, we run M-PBPRA. We start from s3, A and B can
use s3 while A has fair share of greater than one. Thus,we assign f3A to s3 and
remove any tuple (∗, s3) form the table. The fair share of A is reduced by one so
FSA − FSA − 1 = 0.42. The next slot is s4, C is the only airline that can use and
afford s4 so, f1C goes to s4 and FSA − FSA − 1 = 0.72. For s5, three airlines can
use the slot (none of them has fair share ≥ 1 and we consider all of them).One of
the airlines is chosen with probabilities:
P (A) =
0.42
0.42 + 0.86 + 0.72
= 0.21 P (B) =
0.86
2




Suppose B is chosen, therefore from PListB we assign f4B to s5. The fair
share of B is reduced to zero. The last slot, s6 is chosen by lottery between A and
C. Suppose C receives the slot. Thus, f2C goes to s6.
Table 5.3 provides the flights to slots assignment for the five procedures DP-
PRA, MDP-PRA, PBPRA, M-PBPRA and RBS. As you can see, in both DP-PRA
and MDP-PRA A and B receive their first priority while, in the other three proce-
dures, the airlines receive the second best preferences. In all proposed procedures
C received one slot, while in RBS it does not receive any slots.
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We will see in the experimental section of this chapter that DP-PRA and
MDP-PRA assign fewer slots but less delays to airlines in A1 who prefer to receive
priority. In the other words, these two procedures assign more slots to airlines in
A− A1 who are interested to receive more slot instead of receiving priority.
5.4 Equity of DP-PRA
As explained in the previous chapter, we evaluate the equity of a procedure
using three criteria : fairness, efficiency and incentive. One parameter to measure
the fairness is called Equal Treatment Of Equals. Below, we discuss which equity
principals are met by DP-PRA or MDP-PRA.
As we said, there are two sets of airlines. The first set of carriers, A1, includes
carriers who prefer to receive priority and receive fewer slots but less delay. The other
set, A−A1, includes carriers who are not interested to receive priority instead they
prefer to receive more slots. Carriers must have sufficient budget (FairShare ≥
PH) to be considered in the first set. Without loss of generality, suppose A1 =
{a1, ..., aL}. The number of slots that will be assigned to each carrier in the first
phase of algorithm is mi,1 = (FSi − (FSi mod∗ PH))/PH . Therefore, for each
a ∈ A1 the first mi,1 flight(s) in its priority list would be assigned slots in the first
phase. Thus, the total number of slots assigned in the first phase is m1 =
∑L
i=1 mi,1.





x ∈ {0, 1}K×m : ∑a∈A xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ S
bFSi
PL
c ≤ ∑j xi,j ≤ dFSiPL e ∀i /∈ A1
mi,1 + bFSi mod∗ PHPL c ≤
∑
j xi,j ≤ mi,1 + dFSi mod
∗ PH
PL





Denote by Πi ∈ Q(F ), one such allocation. Here, we assume that all slots can
be assigned, or in the other words our problem is strictly non-decomposable, which
means
∑
a∈A xij = 1 ∀j ∈ S.
The first constraint assigns one flight to one slot, the second constraint, assign
flights to the carriers that prefer more slots (not belonging to set A1). As explained,
in the second phase of the algorithm the fair share of all carriers increased by factor
of 1/PL. The last constraint is for carriers in A1: they must receive mi,1 slots during
the first phase of algorithm, the remaining slots are assigned in the second phase.
Our procedure chooses each deterministic assignment with a probability. To
see the efficiency of the algorithms, we have to show that every deterministic as-
signment is Pareto-Optimal.
Proposition 5.4.1 In a strictly non-decomposable problem , all deterministic as-
signments in Q(F ) are Pareto-optimal.
Proof Suppose carrier a prefers Π′ to Π. Without loss of generality, suppose all
carriers have the same allocation in Π and Π′ except carrier b. We investigate three
possible cases:
First case: a, b ∈ A − A1. If Π′ Âa Π then two options are possible: 1- a has
bFSa/PLc in Π and it receives one more slot in Π′. Since our problem is strictly
non-decomposable, therefore. there must be another carrier, b, to loose a slot. Then
Π′ b Π. 2- If a exchanges slot sj, in allocation Π, with si, where ti < tj. Therefore,
Π′ Âa Π. Since our problem is strictly non-decomposable, it means all slots have
been used, then b has to loose earlier slot si and receive later slot sj. Thus, b does
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not prefer Π′ to Π.
Second case: a ∈ A1, b ∈ A − A1. In order for a to prefers allocation Π′ to
Π, three options are possible. 1- a receives one more slot in Π′. In that case, since
the number of slots it receive in the priority is known, ma,1, then a must receives
one more slots in the second phase of algorithm. Since, our problem is strictly non-
decomposable then b has to loose a slot. Therefore, Π′ b Π. 2- If a exchanges a slot
with b. Say, slot sj is exchanged with si, such that Π
′ Âa Π. In this case, since a is
in high priority set, if sj is obtained by a in the first phase, then it is not possible to
exchange sj with any slot of b, since b is not in the priority set, and obtain a better
allocation. If sj is obtained in the second phase, then in order to receive a better
allocation, si has to be an earlier slot. Therefore, b has to loose si and receive sj,
since the problem is strictly non-decomposable. Thus, Π′ b Π.
Third case: a, b ∈ A1. In this case two options are possible in order to Π′ Âa Π:
1- a has bFSa/PLc slots in Π and it receives one more slot in Π′. Because the num-
ber of slots a receives in the first phase is known, ma,1, thus, a has to receive the
extra slot in the second phase. Our problem in strictly non-decomposable therefore,
b has to loose a slot. Thus Π′ b Π. 2- a receives si in Π′ instead of sj in Π. a
prefers Π′ to Π, therefore si Âa sj. Thus, if si is a slot that a receives in the first
phase in stead of sj then, it means that b has to loose si. But b prefers si, because
in allocation Π, it chooses si, therefore Π
′ b Π. If si is in the set of slots allocate
in the second phase, then si has to be an earlier slot in order to Π
′ Âa Π. We know
that our problem is strictly non-decomposable, then b has to loose an earlier slot si
and receive sj. Therefore, Π
′ b Π. •
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Both DP-PRA and MDP-PRA are randomized procedures which means they
choose each deterministic allocation with a probability. Therefore:
Corollary 5.4.1 Both DP-PRA and MDP-PRA meet ex-post efficiency.
It is clear that both DP-PRA and MDP-PRA are anonymous procedures,
which means they assign flights to slots without taking into account the name of
carriers. And also it is clear that the ex-ante Equal Treatment of Equals property is
held by both of these procedures. However, behavior of DP-PRA and MDP-PRA on
total slot value assigned to a carrier and also ex-post property which deals with the
actual total number of slots assigned to the carrier are not clear or straight forward.
In the following, we explain and investigate these two in more details.
It is well known that the stronger form of ETE is ex-post. Validity of the ex-
post ETE property for a procedure implies if two carriers have equal fair share that
belong to the same set, then there should not be more than one slot difference in the
actual total number of slots the carriers will receive based on the procedure. Both
DP-PRA and MDP-PRA procedures are maintaining the ex-post ETE property and
it is proved in the next proposition.
We already defined concept of slot values, PH and PL, where PH is assigned
to a slot while PL is calculated based on the procedure. Now, the actual total slot
value for a carrier after using the procedure can be calculated based on wether slot
value is PH or PL, and based on actual total number of slots received by that carrier.
Both DP-PRA and MDP-PRA procedures are providing an interesting behavior on
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the actual total slot value for a carrier.
After applying any of DP-PRA and MDP-PRA, then for any two carriers
with equal fair share the difference in actual total slot value for two carriers with
the same fair share will be less than an upper bound of 2PL. To be more precise,
if two carriers with equal fair share belong to the same set, then the difference in
actual total slot value for each carrier is less than PL. And if two carriers with
equal fair share belong to two different sets, then the difference in actual total slot
value for each carrier is less than 2PL. This means after applying any of DP-PRA
and MDP-PRA procedures, then actual total slot value for airlines with equal fair
share will be in reasonable bound. In the next proposition, we first formulate this
behavior, and then we prove it.
If Yi and Vi are the actual number of slots and actual total slot value a carrier
receives then it follows :
Theorem 5.4.1 In a strictly non-decomposable problem for two carriers a and b
with the same fair share:
(a) a, b ∈ A1 |Ya − Yb| < 1 and also a, b ∈ A− A1 |Ya − Yb| < 1
(b) a, b ∈ A1 or a, b ∈ A− A1 then |Va − Vb| ≤ PL
(c) a ∈ A, a ∈ A− A1 then |Va − Vb| ≤ 2PL




Proof (a)- If we consider carriers a and b with the same share, FSa = FSb, in
the set A1 then the number of slots they receive in the first phase is equal to
ma,1 = (FSa − (FSa mod∗ PH))/PH and the remainder of their share would be
equal for the second phase. In the second phase, since the problem is strictly non
decomposable, then all slots have been assigned. Consequently, based on Theorem
4.4.1, if Yi is the number of slots that a carrier i receives in the second phase then:
|Ya − Yb| ≤ 1
Proof (b) and (c)- In terms of the value of slots that an airline receives, if :
(i) a ∈ A1 then Va = PH ×ma,1 + Ya × PL
(ii) a ∈ A− A1 then Va = Ya × PL
If two carriers belong to the same set, it can be concluded from (a) that |Va−Vb| <
PL. But if a and b belong to different sets then : Va = PH × ma,1 + Ya × PL
and Vb = Yb × PL. If we substitute the value of ma,1 then we have Va = (FSa −
(FSa mod
∗ PH)) + Ya × PL. Define Ra = (FSa mod∗ PH).
In the second phase the number of slots that carrier a would definitely re-
ceive is: ma,2 = (Ra − (Ra mod∗ PL))/PL and for carrier b is mb,2 = (FSb −
(FSb mod
∗ PL))/PL if we substitute these two values we have:
Va = (FSa −Ra) + Ra − (Ra mod∗ PL) + Y ′a × PL
Vb = FSb − (FSb mod∗ PL) + Y ′b × PL
where Y ′ is a random variable with the value of 0 or 1. Therefore:
|Va − Vb| = |Y ′a × PL − (Ra mod∗ PL)− Y ′b × PL + (FSb mod∗ PL)|
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If Y ′a = Y
′
b then |Va− Vb| = |(Ra mod∗ PL)− (FSb mod∗ PL)|. If |Y ′a − Y ′b | = 1 then:
|Va − Vb| = |PL ± ((Ra mod∗ PL)− (FSb mod∗ PL))|
≤ PL + |(Ra mod∗ PL)− (FSb mod∗ PL)| ≤ 2PL. •
As we can see, if two carriers have the same fair share and belong to the same
set then ex post equal treatment of equals holds. However, there will be a difference
in the value the they receive. This difference however is guaranteed to be small.
We now need to investigate the degree to which our algorithms encourage
truthfulness relative to preference revelation. That is the degree to which carriers
can manipulate preferences in order to receive a better allocation. We explained
strategy-proofness in the previous chapter. Since we have a random allocation pro-
cedure, strategy proofness means that a carrier can not receive an allocation that
stochastically dominates the current allocation by using non-truthful preferences.
Proposition 5.4.2 In a strictly diverse non-decomposable problem both DP-PRA
and MDP-PRA procedures meet strategy proofness.
Proof Assume m1 is total number of slots that are going to be assigned in the first
phase. And suppose a ∈ A1 wants to manipulate its preference while other airlines
are truthful. Moreover, assume that a actually prefers si. There are there different
cases that we discuss strategy proofness for them as follow.
Case 1: a ∈ A and a falsifies its preference in the first phase. If a does not
say its true preference in the first phase, for example si Âa sj, but a falsifies its
preference by sj Â∗a si. Now in executing DP-PRA and MDP-PRA procedures, if
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a is chosen in the first phase, then a receives sj instead of si. So, a’s fair share
is reduced by value of PH . Considering set of flight-to-slot is strictly diverse non-
decomposable, so more than one airline competes for any slot. After receiving sj by
a at first phase, a has less faire share for next round if it is chosen by the procedures.
Consequently, a’s chance for wining si is decreased since a has to compete with some
other airlines on slot si.
Case 2: a ∈ A and a falsifies its preference in the second phase. The proof is
similar to Theorem 4.4.1.
•
5.5 Experimental Results
In our experiment, we use the same test data set as previous chapter. This
data set that had been employed by the CDM Future Concepts Team to perform
human-in-the-loop experiments related to SEVEN. It contained 386 flights with
38 flight operators. The data included scheduled arrival arrival times at an FCA
boundary. The FCA duration was from 18:00 pm to 21:00 pm. As we explained in
previous chapter a flight cost function can be generated as:




0 x ≤ 15
(32 + 0.1P )(x− 15) 15 < x ≤ Mp
(32 + 0.1P )(Mp − 15) x > Mp
Where Mp is flight specific max delay. Given the cost function, we generated the
priority list for each flight operator based on all available flights that could use a
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slot; and the assumption is that the flight operator preferred allocating the slot to
the flight with the highest marginal cost of delay. The flight operators are randomly
assigned to set A1, the ones who prefer to receive better slots, or A − A1, flight
operators who prefer to receive more slots.
We compared the results of DP-PRA and MDP-PRA against ration-by-schedule
(RBS), which is currently used to allocate FCA access during airspace flow programs.
In our experiment, we considered 40%, 50%, 60%, 70% and 80% en-route capacity
reduction for the FCA. We performed 2000 repetitions of the procedure since both
procedures are random. In first part of all of our experiment we set PH = 2. We






Table 5.4: List of airlines that can participate in the first phase and the number of
slots are assigned
will show later the effect of changing PH . For each capacity reduction, the number
of carriers that can participate in the first phase of algorithm is different. It is clear
that as capacity increases the fair share of each airline increases, consequently the
number of airlines that can participate will increase as well. Airlines 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9,
17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35 have the second policy. Table 5.5 shows
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Table 5.5: Comparison of Average number of slots and average slot values received
by each carrier
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the airlines and number of flights (or slots) that are assigned in the first phase for
each capacity reduction. The fair share of each airlines and the number of slots they
received is shown in table 5.5. The first part of table (above the bold line) shows
the airlines who like to receive less delay.






Table 5.6: Comparison of cost reduction for DP-PRA and MDP-PRA vs. RBS
We should note that for 40% capacity reduction our problem is not strictly non-
decomposable. Table 5.5 shows the percentage of cost savings for the two algorithms
when compared to RBS. If we compare this with the result of PBPRA or MPB-PRA
from previous chapter, we notice that the cost saving is almost the same. But if
we compare the total delay saving (Table 5.5) , DP-PRA and MDP-PRA are better
than PBPRA and M-PBPRA.
The main advantage of DP-PRA or MDP-PRA compared to previous proce-
dures is to meet carriers’ preference better. Figure 5.1(a) shows the average number
of slots carriers in A1 receives compare to previous procedures for 60% capacity re-
duction. We can see the comparison of delay in figure 5.1(b). As we can see, airlines
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Table 5.7: Comparison of delay reduction for DP-PRA and MDP-PRA vs. RBS
in A1 save more delay and in return they receive fewer slots.
5.5.1 Effect of PH
So far we have used PH = 2 in all of our experiments. Here we want to
investigate the effect of PH in overall performance of DP-PRA and MDP-PRA.
Choosing the right PH is a challenge for the FAA. There can be many different
performance criteria; for example, deviation from carriers’ fair share, total internal
cost, how many slots should be assigned in the first phase. Here we explain the
effect of PH on some of performance criteria. In all of our examples we consider
40% capacity reduction in enroute resources.
As we expect, when PH increases the number of carriers in A1 decreases. Also,
the number of slots assigned in the first phase decreases as well (Figure 5.2). For
example, if the FAA decides to assign 25% or 15% of available slots in the first phase




Figure 5.1: (a) Comparison of number of slots received for airlines in A1. (b)
Comparison of delay for the airlines in A1 for all procedures
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be seen, the number of airlines is considered in the first phase is reduced from 8 to
7 airlines.
Figure 5.2: Effect of primary slot values on the number of slots assigned in the first
phase, the bars show number of airlines that can participate in the first phase
The second performance criteria is to minimize the total internal cost. This is
very hard for the FAA to measure because each carrier’s cost information is private.
Figure 5.3 shows the total internal cost of airlines for different primary slot values.
As it can be seen we have two local minima: one occurs at at the value of 1.25 for
DPPRA and 1.5 for MDP-PRA; the second local minimum occurs at PH = 3.25 and
PH = 3.0 for DPPRA and MDP-PRA respectively.
The FAA can also consider the deviation from fair share as a one criteria.
Figure 5.4(a) shows the total define Minimum Square Error (MSE) of slot values
from carriers’ fair share. As can be seen, a minimum occurs at PH = 2.75 and
PH = 3.5 for both procedures.
The other criterion is that, those carriers who are not in A1 they should receive
more slots instead. The second graph (on the left vertical axis of Figure 5.4(b))
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Figure 5.3: Effect of primary slot values on total internal cost
shows the total MSE of the difference between the number of slots and the carriers’
fair share (carriers who are not in A1 are considered). The maximum happens at
PH = 3 for both procedures.
We can also consider the combination of all criteria together. In this case
maybe choosing PH between 3 to 3.5 is a good choice.
5.6 Discussion
In this section a new procedure for slot allocation has been proposed. Unlike
PBPRA and M-PBPRA that assigns the same value to all slots. In DP-PRA and
MDP-PRA, we consider two values for slots. The main goal is to address carriers’
preferences better. As mentioned, carriers who wish to give priority to certain flights,
may be willing to pay more for some particular slots. In our procedures, we use two




Figure 5.4: (a) Effect of primary slot values on MSE of slot values. (b) Effect of
primary slot values on MSE of number of slots from fair share for airlines in A−A1
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be charged more for each premium slot they receive. Our procedures meets ETE,
efficiency and strategy proofness. As it was shown in our experiment carriers can
meet their preferences better than previous algorithms. A challenge here is to decide





This research was motivated by fair allocation of scarce resources among flight
operators, agents, especially when there is competition among agents. We specifi-
cally looked at problems that arise, when, due to bad weather, there is a capacity
reduction in a part of the airspace for a period of time and it is not possible for all
flights who are scheduled during that period of time to pass through constrained
area. Therefore, some of flights must be rerouted or receive a departure delay.
Each airline will typically place a different relative weight on delays, rerouting
and cancellation. Whereas some airlines would like to preserve on-time performance
for certain flights and cancel or reroute many other flights, other airlines prefer to
have less rerouting and cancellations while tolerating higher total delay. Therefore
a key challenge is to determine how many slots each airline should receive and how
we can include airlines’ preferences while maintaining fairness.
We proposed a new rationing procedure that is based on Proportional Random
Assignment. In contrast to RBS that gives access only to the earliest flights, the new
rationing algorithm considers all flights that are disrupted by an AFP. Therefore,
small carriers, which have fewer flights or carriers whose flights are scheduled late,
can still have a share of available slots. The new method for computing a fair share
of available resources implicity gives a larger share to the flights that are scheduled
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earlier. However, no flight can receive more than one slot as its fair share. We use the
fair share of carriers as an input to our random allocation procedures. Therefore,
carriers with positive share will have chance to receive slots. Our approach for
computing a fair share achieves principles such as impartiality, equal treatment of
equals, consistency and demand monotonicity.
In chapter 4 of this dissertation, we proposed randomized methods, Preference
Based Proportional Random Allocation (PBPRA) and Modified PBPRA, that use
an exogenous fair share as a parameter to assign flights to slots. Carriers are entitled
to receive a number of slots based on their fair share. It is guaranteed that any carrier
receives at least the floor of its fair share. These methods give carriers whose flights
are scheduled late a chance of receiving a slot. Another main advantage of the new
algorithms is to include carriers’ preferences. Carriers’ can express their preferences
over slots and these preferences considered during the allocation process. We also
explored the principles of our allocation procedures. We showed that PBPRA and
M-PBPRA meet equity principles and also have ex-post efficiency and strategy
proofness properties. Also, we tested our algorithms on real data. Our algorithms
showed improved performance compare to the RBS. In PBPRA and M-PBPRA,
expected total number of slots that a carrier receives is very close to its fair share.
In PBPRA (or M-PBPRA), although slot preferences were employed we im-
plicity assumed that all slots had equal values. In reality, some slots are worth more
tan others. Those carriers that would like to maintain on time performance for key
flights may be willing to pay more than others for particular slots. It is typically the
case that carriers have higher preference for earlier slots, while the later slots are less
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favored. Thus, it does make sense that earlier slots, which have more demand, have
more weight than later slots, which are less preferred. In both algorithms, we did not
elicit preferences related to the trade off between delay and rerouting. We addressed
this problem with Dual Price Proportional Random Allocation(DP-PRA).
In DP-PRA and MDP-PRA, we consider two values for slots. The main goal
is to meet carriers’ preferences better. As mentioned, some carriers who like to
maintain their on time performance for certain flights may be willing to pay more
for some particular slots. Airlines who wish to receive better slots for select flights
can do so, but in return are charged more for such slot they receive. Our procedures
meets ETE, efficiency and strategy proofness. As it was shown in our experiments,
carriers can meet their preferences better than previous algorithms. Also, carriers
receive the expected total value of slots very close to their fair share.
In this dissertation, weather conditions are considered constant during the
AFP period. A potential research is to investigate resource allocation considering
dynamic weather. In reality, weather can change during the time horizon and so
there is a change in available resources as well. To much more efficient use of
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